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My dissertation comprises three empirical studies on development and labor
economics. The first two essays are in the context of National Employment
Guarantee Schemes (thereafter, NREGA) in India. In the first one, I study
whether existing inequality hinders the implementations of NREGA, using
district-level data on land ownership distribution and the implementations of
NREGA. To address potential endogeneity issues, I leverage a historical institu-
tion in India, the land revenue collection system established by British colonial
rulers during 1750-1861, to construct an instrumental variable for land inequal-
ity. Both OLS and instrumental variable results give robust evidence that the
concentration of land ownership reduces public works provision. This relation-
ship could be explained by the mechanism that public works schemes raise agri-
cultural wages in the private labor market, thereby incentivizing big landlords
to use their political power to oppose this program. This paper provides the
first empirical evidence that the concentration of landownership, a proxy for
political power, is a hurdle to providing public employment to the poor. In the
second essay, I focus on the participants of NREGA and study the wage bar-
gaining effect of participating in NREGA. Using a household level panel and
a difference-in-differences framework, I find indirect evidence that participat-
ing in NREGA would increase the wage bargaining power for both participants
themselves and for their spouses in the private labor market.
The third essay focuses on a different social protection policy, minimum
wage standards in China. I utilize a spatial lag methodology to study city-
level strategic interactions in setting and enforcing minimum wage standards
during 2004-2012 in China. This analysis finds strong evidence of spatial inter-
dependence in minimum wage standards and enforcement among main cities
in China. If other cities decrease minimum wage standards by 1 RMB, the host
city will decrease its standard by about 0.7-3.2 RMB. If the violation rate in other
cities increases by 1 percentage point, the host city will respond by an increase
of roughly 0.4-1.0 percentage points. These interactions suggest the need for
policy coordination in labor regulation.
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CHAPTER 1
LAND INEQUALITY AND THE PROVISION OF PUBLIC
WORKS—EVIDENCE FROM NATIONAL RURAL EMPLOYMENT
GUARANTEE SCHEME IN INDIA
1.1 Abstract
Does existing inequality hinder redistributive policies that aim to help the poor?
This paper answers this question under a widely used redistributive policy in
developing countries—public works schemes. Using district-level data on land
ownership distributions and the implementations of the National Rural Em-
ployment Guarantee Scheme in India, I find robust evidence that the concen-
tration of land ownership reduces public works provision. This relationship
could be explained by the mechanism that public works schemes raise agricul-
tural wages in the private labor market, thereby incentivizing big landlords to
use their political power to oppose this program. To address the potential en-
dogeneity due to unobservables and measurement error, I leverage a historical
institution in India, the land revenue collection system established by British
colonial rulers during 1750-1861, to construct an instrumental variable for land
inequality. Due to the concentration of post-independence land reforms enacted
in landlord-dominated areas, those areas have lower land inequality today than
the previously non-landlord dominated areas. The IV estimates suggest that a
1 percent increase of land Gini coefficient would lead to a 3-6 percent decrease
in public job provision. The results are robust to using the alternative mea-
surements of land inequality and public works implementation. To exclude the
possibility that the higher provision of public jobs in more equal areas is driven
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by a higher demand for public jobs, I show that more equal areas have higher
agricultural wages in the private labor sector. This paper provides the first em-
pirical evidence that the concentration of land ownership, a proxy for politi-
cal power, is a hurdle to providing public employment to the poor, suggesting
power asymmetries could hinder policies aimed at promoting equity.
1.2 Introduction
Does inequality lead to more or less redistributive efforts to the poor? This
question has been studied extensively using theoretical models, with the earlier
literature suggesting a positive association (e.g. Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Pers-
son and Tabellini, 1994) and the more recent literature suggesting a negative
association (e.g. Benabou, 2000; Galor et al., 2009). The empirical evidence is
relatively lacking in identifying the direction of the effect and the mechanisms
through which inequality might affect redistributive policy, with a few excep-
tions (e.g. Boustan et al., 2013; Cinnirella and Hornung, 2016; Ramcharan, 2010).
The inequality of land ownership is an important form of inequality, as land
is the main production factor before the industrial economy and still today in
many developing countries. Furthermore, the distribution of land is directly
linked to the concentration of political power. This power gravitates towards
landlords, who may either influence tenants’ votes or directly influence the
politicians in the direction beneficial to themselves. The literature has provided
evidence that large landlord elites influence the political process to prevent eco-
nomic reforms or redistributive policies, such as educational expenditure (Cin-
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nirella and Hornung, 2016; Ramcharan, 2010), human-capital accumulation (Ga-
lor et al., 2009), general social assistance programs (Anderson et al., 2015) and
public goods (Beg, 2016).
In line with these recent studies, this paper answers the question regard-
ing land inequality and redistribution under another widely used redistributive
policy—public work schemes, which, due to its complexity in design and imple-
mentation, warrant special attention. A public works program is the provision
of employment at a prescribed wage for those unable to find alternative employ-
ment by the creation of public infrastructure projects, such as transport infras-
tructure (e.g. roads, railroads and canals) and public services (e.g. sewage and
dams). It is financed by the government and functions as a form of social safety
net in many developing countries, such as India, Philippines, Bangladesh and
Chile (Subbarao, 1997). The provision of public jobs raises agricultural wages
in the private labor market (Imbert and Papp, 2015), thereby incentivizing big
landlords to use their political power to oppose this program. India is the per-
fect context studying the relation between land inequality and the provision
of public works, because it has the world’s largest public works program—the
National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (thereafter, NREGA) and faced
with a historical tension arising from land inequality.
In this paper, I compare district (within-state) variations of land ownership
inequality and public works provision, using census data on district-level land
distribution in 2005 and the implementation data of the NREGA program since
its inauguration in 2006. Land inequality is measured by the Gini coefficient.
The provision level of public employment is measured by four dimensions: the
fraction of rural households provided with employment, the per capita labor ex-
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penditure, average days of employment provided per person in either Schedule
Caste or Schedule Tribe (thereafter, SC/ST) and the total number of completed
works per rural person. OLS estimates suggest that a 1 percent difference in
land Gini coefficient leads to a 0.6-1 percent gap in NREGA provision.
To address the potential endogeneity issue arising from measurement er-
rors and omitted variables in the OLS estimation, I use a historical institution
as the instrumental variable for land inequality—the land revenue collection
system established by British colonial rulers during 1750-1861. This variable
derives from the study by Banerjee and Iyer (2005). Despite a higher Gini coef-
ficient of land ownership inequality in landlord-dominated areas during 1885-
1948, such areas experienced more frequent land reforms after Indian indepen-
dence. Therefore, the first-stage conditional correlations suggest that landlord-
dominated districts have significantly lower Gini land ownership inequality
in 2005. Under the assumption that the instrument is exogenous, the IV esti-
mates confirm the negative effect of land ownership inequality on public works
schemes. 2SLS estimates suggest that a 1% difference of land Gini coefficient
leads to a 3-6 % gap in NREGA provision. To examine the sensitivity of the
results to the exclusion condition, I construct bounds for the 2SLS estimates fol-
lowing Conley et al. (2012). The negative effect still holds when relaxing the
exclusion restriction of the instrumental variable by allowing a negative associ-
ation between the instrument variable and NREGA provision and a slight posi-
tive relation between these two variables.
Both OLS and IV results are robust when using the alternative measurement
of land inequality—the share of land owned by the top 10% largest farmers,
which more directly captures the top distribution and hence large farmers’ po-
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litical power. I finally exclude the possibility that the higher provision of public
jobs in more equal areas is due to a higher demand for public jobs, by showing
these more equal areas have higher agricultural wages in private sector.
To make sense of the results, compare two districts A and B with similar
socio-economic characteristics. If district A’s land Gini Coefficient is 1% (equiv-
alent to 0.0047 in absolute terms) larger than that in district B, then district A
will have 5% fewer households provided with NREGA jobs; per capita NREGA
labor expenditure in district A will be 4% lower than that in district B; each
person in Schedule Caste or Schedule Tribe in district A will on average work
3% fewer days than those from district B; the total number of works per rural
person completed in district A will be 6% lower than that in district B.
This study adds to the understanding of the heterogeneity of the implemen-
tation of NREGA across different districts. NREGA claims to provide 100 days
of working opportunity to each rural household in need of jobs. As a mat-
ter of fact, however, there is an un-met demand for jobs in almost all districts
and the extent of un-met demand differs by districts. Existing literature has
been trying to explain this heterogeneity of NREGA implementation mostly in
terms of political incentives and administrative capacity (Gulzar and Pasquale,
2016; Niehaus and Sukhtankar, 2013; Nath, 2015; Gupta and Mukhopadhyay,
2016; Sheahan et al., 2016), and of the political reservation system (Dunning and
Nilekani, 2013; Bose and Das, 2015). To the best of my knowledge, this paper is
the first study to link district-level heterogeneity in the provision of NREGA jobs
to the inequality of land ownership distribution. Districts with more concen-
trated land distributions are expected to see a lower provision of NREGA em-
ployment, because in those districts big farmers have stronger political power to
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block wage-increasing public works schemes. Indeed, there is abundant anec-
dotal evidence showing big farmers lobby to suspend the provision of NREGA
employment (e.g. Maiorano, 2014), but broad-based quantitative testing of this
notion has not been attempted previously. 1
Investigating the question of land inequality and public works provision
adds to the understanding of Indian land inequality which, as a legacy of British
colonial institutions, has been a historically important and intricate issue. The
relation between landlords and the landless affects different aspects of rural life
and shapes the effectiveness of public policies. There has been a large number
of land reforms since Indian independence, but most of them are through leg-
islated ceilings on landholding (rather than direct land redistribution) and such
reforms have been rarely implemented with any degree of seriousness (Besley
and Burgess, 2000). As a result, after all those land reforms, the share of land
occupied by the top 10% biggest farmers is still about 46%. This paper shows
that the concentration of land ownership hence political power is a hurdle to
redistributive efforts and successful anti-poverty policies, and offers a poten-
tial justification for further efforts at land reform. Moreover, compared to the
estimates derived using soil or other geographical information as instrumental
variables, the IV estimates in the current paper are particularly policy relevant
because the lower levels of land inequality seem to be driven by land reforms
(rather than natural conditions).
1In studying clientilism between landlords and the landless in Indian villages, Anderson
et al. (2015) show land-owning elites will prefer weak provision of centrally funded pro-poor
prgrams such as Employment Guarantee Program. The current paper differs from their paper
in at least three respects. First, their survey data is restricted to 3 regions in the state of Ma-
harashtra, while the current study uses district-wise nationally representative data. Second,
they proxy landlords’ political power by the proportions of land in the village dominated by
the upper caste, Maratha. I use the concentration of land ownership, which goes beyond the
constraint of caste backgrounds and have more general implications. Third, the pro-poor policy
in their paper, EGS, is a previous form of NREGA. It is believed that NREGA has incorporated
the lessons and successes of EGS, with broader goals and better implementations.
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This paper speaks to the general discussion of inequality and public expen-
ditures. The literature finds a detrimental effect of early inequality on the emer-
gence of human-capital accumulating and growth-promoting institutions (e.g.
Persson and Tabellini, 1994; Sokoloff and Engerman, 2000; Galor et al., 2009).
The main mechanism is that land concentration induces landowners to use
political power to assure lower public expenditure in education, for fear that
higher public education investment would raise up labor cost or generate mi-
gration from agricultural sector to industrial sector. This mechanism also ap-
plies in the context of public works schemes. Providing public employment to
the landless and the marginal farmers will increase labor wages (Imbert and
Papp, 2015), and this wage effect will incentivize landlord elites to oppose the
implementation of the public works schemes (Anderson et al., 2015; Maiorano,
2014).
This paper also broadly speaks to the literature on inequality, redistribution
and economic growth. This literature initially argues that inequality is con-
ducive to the adoption of growth-retarding redistributive policies (Alesina and
Rodrik, 1994; Persson and Tabellini, 1994). Under democratic societies, if the
median voter is poorer than the average voter, then the majority vote will lead
to high tax rates and more redistribution to the poor, which impedes invest-
ment and economic growth. This mechanism is supported by some existing
literature (Boustan et al., 2013). However, the current paper, coupled with other
recent empirical evidence (e.g Galor et al., 2009; Ramcharan, 2010), casts doubt
on this underlying mechanism. In contrast, the evidence suggests that inequal-
ity is a hurdle for redistribution, provided that the landlords, or better-endowed
agents, have sufficient political power to influence redistribution policies.
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I discuss the
background information of the NREGA, highlighting the necessary facts that
make it possible for landlords to play a role in the provision of NREGA jobs.
Section 3 discusses the mechanism of how land inequality affects public works
provision. Section 4 discusses data issues. Section 5 presents the empirical strat-
egy and principal findings, followed by robustness checks relaxing the perfect
exogeneity restriction and using alternative measurements of the NREGA im-
plementation and land inequality. Section 7 concludes.
1.3 Background: The National Rural Employment Guarantee
Act
1.3.1 Demand-Driven Nature of NREGA Employment
The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act of 2005 cre-
ated the “right to work” for all households in rural India through the National
Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme. It was a three-phased nation-wide roll-
out, with 199 districts in Phase 1 (Feb 2006), 128 districts in Phase 2 (April 2007)
and the remaining 261 districts in Phase 3 (April 2008). By 2008, it reached all
districts in India. It is the largest public works program in the world so far and
asserts guaranteeing 100 days of working opportunity for each household per
financial year (June in the current year to May in next year). Households need
to obtain job cards from the local governments, which are used to record work
done and payment. According to the Act, as long as an eligible household files
applications for jobs, the local government must provide employment within
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15 days and within 5 kilometers of the applicant’s home. Otherwise, states are
liable to pay unemployment allowances. However, in practice there are still
frictions in the implementation leading to some unmet demand, such that those
wanting work do not get it in a timely manner.
More than half of the works are related to water conservation, with other
types of works including irrigation provision, land development and rural con-
nectivity. Wages are to be paid at the statutory minimum wage rates, which
makes this program a means of enforcing minimum wage laws. The wage rate
is job specific rather than gender specific, as opposed to the private labor market
where women earn a much lower wage rate than men. Therefore, NREGA jobs
are especially appealing for women. As a social insurance tool, NREGA has a
stronger demand in backward areas with poor agricultural conditions, such as
bad soil and weather. For instance, Santangelo (2016) finds workers resort to
NREGA to a larger extent when the local economy is hit by worse agricultural
productivity shocks.
1.3.2 Financing NREGA and the Supply Constraint
The National Rural Employment Guarantee Act incentivises States to provide
employment by stating that 100 percent of the unskilled labor cost and 75 per-
cent of the material cost of the program is borne by the central government. The
labor to material ratio could vary from 90:10 to 60:40.
The overall annual labor spending on NREGA at state/district/ block/ vil-
lage level is a pre-determined cap. Labor budget for each financial year is deter-
mined in the previous year, following a “bottom-up” process from the village
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level to the state level and last to the central government (NREGA Operational
Guidelines, 2013). This budget plan includes (i) the anticipated quantity of de-
mand for jobs in the next year (ii) the precise timing of the demand for work
and (iii) a shelf of projects to be prepared and prioritized to meet job demand.
Table 1.1 presents the various steps involved in the preparation and finalization
of annual labor budgets. Because labor budget is an estimation and NREGA is
a demand driven program, the Act states that the States may, based on actual
performance, any time during the year, come back to the Ministry requesting
revision of their existing labor budget, following the procedures in Table 1.1.
However, in fact, the flexibility is limited. Once the labor budget is finalized,
the maximum supply of jobs in each state/district/block will not be changed
for the next financial year.
Therefore, there will be a shortage of supply for NREGA jobs if any of the
following cases occurs—(i) an exogenously fixed maximum level of spending
on NREGA by the center government; (ii) an underestimation of job demand in
the budget planning; (iii) a poor timing of job demand; and other cases. The ac-
tual implementation is further complicated by states’ constraints in organizing
projects and workers. Even if the budget planning is not an issue, accommo-
dating supply to demand could still be a challenge because of the incapability
to meet the relatively skilled labor requirements at the local level, such as pan-
chayat technical assistants (Dutta et al., 2014). As a result, although the NREGA
program is designed to be a demand-driven program, there is an un-met de-
mand for jobs in almost all states (Dutta et al., 2014). On average, each house-
hold works roughly 35 person-days per financial year, far less than the claimed
100 days. The extent of the un-met demand differs by districts and by time.
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Table 1.1: Timelines for various steps involved in preparation and finaliza-
tion of annual labor budget.
Source: Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act 2005 – Operational
Guidelines, 4th version. Chapter 6.10.
1.3.3 Landlords and NREGA Employment
In addition to supply constraints in implementing the NREGA, landlords could
also affect the supply of public jobs. Providing public jobs to the landless and
marginal farmers will increase labor wages (Imbert and Papp, 2015), which will
potentially increase production costs for landlords who hire casual labors. Thus
this wage effect brings landlords an economic incentive to oppose the imple-
mentation of NREGA (Anderson et al., 2015; Maiorano, 2014). There are at least
two stages where big landlords can intervene the process of providing NREGA
jobs.
First, at the stage of making the labor budget, landlords may lobby against a
budget plan that provides enough jobs to the rural poor. As Table 1.1 shows,
budget planning is a bottom-top decision making process. The demand for
11
Table 1.2: Summary statistics of NREGA implementation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
mean/sd mean/sd mean/sd mean/sd mean/sd
% of households provided employment 12.40 17.69 27.32 29.63 31.09
(23.01) (25.16) (26.11) (24.22) (23.81)
avg days of employment provided per rural SCST person 2.01 2.95 5.24 6.57 6.45
(4.55) (5.07) (6.60) (6.93) (7.12)
avg days of employment provided per rural woman 1.25 1.79 3.48 4.32 4.11
(3.66) (3.97) (5.50) (5.90) (5.45)
avg days of employment provided per NREGA-woman 19.00 16.35 17.00 21.61 20.84
(16.27) (17.03) (16.80) (15.88) (13.09)
labor expense per rural person (2006 Rs.) 68.64 92.41 163.12 175.46 167.70
(192.87) (179.99) (258.53) (224.40) (202.98)
number of completed works per 1000 rural persons 1.73 5.06 9.48 13.39 7.68
(5.06) (17.57) (26.09) (20.69) (13.50)
# of districts with employemnt provided 122 202 409 410 415
Observations 416 416 416 416 416
Notes: Original data come from MGNREGA public portal. Only districts used in regression analysis are included. Labor expense
is deflated by state-wise Consumer Price Index, using 2006 as the base year.
NREGA jobs and the shelf of projects are first identified at the Gram Panchayat
level, then the demand and supply are consolidated at the block level, and fur-
ther aggregated at the district and state levels. The fact that lower level gov-
ernments such as block and village have a substantial discretion in this process
renders big landlords’ influences very likely. It is after all easier for landlords to
lobby village governments than state governments.
Second, even after labor budget is made, big farmers can still use their po-
litical power to block the implementation, such as delaying work assignment,
payment and some complementary machinery (see Maiorano (2014) for anec-
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dotal evidence of lobbying). As a result, as NREGA annual report shows, the
final work completed is smaller than the original budget.
1.4 Mechanism
The political mechanism of inequality and redistribution has been established
by the literature. Higher inequality lowers the level of awareness of the poor, de-
creasing the level of their political participation (e.g. Bardhan and Mookherjee,
2005; Ramcharan, 2010). Meanwhile, greater inequality can concentrate the ben-
efits of political participation and simplify the collective action problem among
the landed, which leads to a higher and more effective political participation
among the landed elites. In the cases that the landlord elites are a net loser
from redistribution, they would block redistribution. Therefore, a higher land
inequality predicts lower redistributions to the poor.
As the primary interest of this paper lies in economic effects rather than po-
litical effects, I will impose a crude political mechanism under which landlords
have sufficient political power against redistributive policies. Instead, I will fo-
cus on the economic incentives that lead big landlords to oppose the provision
of public employment.
Providing public jobs to the poor introduces a competition for labor between
the public works schemes and the rural private employers. The literature has
found that the introduction of NREGA increases rural casual labor wages by 6
percent (Imbert and Papp, 2015). This wage effect could potentially reduce land-
lords’ profit, if they keep hiring casual labor. Therefore, the wage-increasing
nature of public works schemes provides big landlords the economic incentives
13
to oppose the program.
1.5 Data
1.5.1 Land Inequality
District-wise data on land distribution in 2005 come from Indian Agricultural
Census (excluding Maharashtra), which is conducted at five yearly intervals.
Although the information is collected on operational land holdings rather than
owned land holdings, the wholly owned and self-operated holdings accounted
for 97.14 percent (Page 29, Agriculture Census Report, 2005). Therefore, I use
this dataset on operational land holdings to approximate the distributions of
land ownership in India. 2
This dataset has information on the number and area of operational holdings
across the following size bins (in 1000 hectares): below 0.5; 0.5-1; 1-2; 2-3; 3-4;
4-5; 5-7.5; 7.5-10; 10-20; 20 & above. 3 I use the average size of land holdings in
each bin to construct land ownership Gini coefficient. The first row of Table 1.3
shows, the average Gini coefficient in our sample districts is 0.47. Figure 1.1
provides state-wise average Gini coefficients in 2005. Figure 1.2 provides the
2According to Agriculture Census in India, “an Operational holder is the person who has
the responsibility for the operation of the agricultural holding and who exercises the technical
initiative and is responsible for its operation.” An operational unit could include multiple plots.
The operated areas comprise of i) Land owned and self operated; ii) Land leased in; iii) Land
otherwise operated.
3I use the information on “Sub-total” land holdings, including both individual holding and
joint holdings, to measure district level land distribution. The ratio of joint holdings to individ-
ual holdings is, 1:6.5 in terms of numbers and 1:5 in terms of areas (Agriculture census report
2005, page 121). Land operated by institutions constituted less than 0.5% of the total area, and
is excluded from the data.
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Figure 1.1: Land inequality (Gini coefficient) by state, 2005
Source: The author calculated Gini coefficient based on district-wise land distribution
data from 2005 Indian Agricultural census. Only states in the OLS regression sample
are included.
shares of operated areas by each decile of holdings. The largest 10 percent of
operational holders operate about 46 percent of total land in India. Figure A.2
in Appendix plots the probability distributions of Gini coefficients. 4
4There is another relevant fact that supports the legitimacy of using the concentration of land
holdings to proxy for landlords’ political power. According to Agriculture Census Report, 2005
(Page 34), about 96.0 percent of the operational holdings and 94.7 percent of operated areas were
operated by village residents whose entire area of land holdings was locating in the village of
his residence. These high ratios reduce the concern that big landlords, whose land is in the
village but who themselves live outside of the village, might not have the political power to
affect NREGA in the current village.
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Figure 1.2: Shares of land area by percentiles of holdings, 2005
Note: Size-classes are as follows: below 0.5; 0.5-1; 1-2; 2-3; 3-4; 4-5; 5-7.5; 7.5-10; 10-20;
20 & above. The graph is derived by first ranking all land holdings by class size in
India, then calculate the share of land operated at each decile.
1.5.2 NREGA Implementation
NREGA implementation data come from public data portal5. Table 1.2 presents
summary statistics of NREGA implementation by financial year (starting from
April in the current year and ends in March the next year) using alternative
measurements. The first row tells that, among all working population in India,
12% of them worked for at least one day in public works in 2006, the first year
that NREGA was introduced. This number increased to 18% in 2007, and 30%
in 2010.
Labor expenses are deflated by state-level consumer price index, using 2006
as the base year. The average wages per rural person received (regardless of
their work status in NREGA) increased from 68 Rupees in 2006 to 167 Rupees
5mnregaweb4.nic.in/netnrega/dynamic2/dynamicreport new4.aspx
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in 2010. Figure A.1 in Appendix plots probability distributions of per capita la-
bor expenditure. When focusing only on the subpopulation that were provided
public employment, the average wages that each household received increased
from 2667 Rupees in 2006 to 2867 Rupees in 2010.
Information on the three-phased roll-out comes from the document
by NREGA Report (2007) 6. Phase 1 include 200 districts, phase 2 includes 130
districts and phase 3 includes the rest of districts. Phases are determined based
on the ranking of Backwardness Index (Zimmermann, 2012). I extract this index
and its five components from Indian Planning Commission 2003 Report, includ-
ing agricultural wages in 1996, agricultural productivity per person 1990-93,
agricultural productivity per hectare 1990-93, ratio of SC/ST in the population
from 1991 census and poverty ratio 1994 (Commission et al., 2003).
I motivate this paper by observing substantial heterogeneity of NREGA im-
plementations across districts. Therefore, it’s important to show variations of
both NREGA and land inequality across districts. Figure 1.1 and Figure 1.3
present state level variations of public works provision and land inequality. Fig-
ure 1.4 visually presents a negative relation between land inequality and public
works provision by doing a kernel regression of the shares of households pro-
vided with public jobs on the share of land occupied by top 10% biggest farms.
1.5.3 Demographic and Geographic Information
District profiles are downloaded from 2001 population census, including caste
composition, employment and industry structure, literacy rate, amenities and
6This online document nicely presents the phase-in progress http :
//nrega.nic.in/MNREGA Dist.pdf
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Figure 1.3: Shares of Households provided with NREGA employment by
state, 2006-2010
Note: Shares are calculated as total number of households provided with NREGA
employment divided by total rural households in the district. All districts in the OLS
regression sample are included.
infrastructural facilities, district area size and so on. Population between 2001
and 2010 are filled using these two years’ census data, assuming a growth rate
equal to that during 1991-2001. Table 1.3 presents summary statistics of district-
wise demographic information in 2005.
The monthly rainfall data are obtained from Center for Climatic Research,
University of Delaware. Indian agricultural year is split into two distinct
seasons– wet season (from June to November) and dry season (from Decem-
ber to May). Existing studies document that NREGA participation is strongly
associated with rainfall shocks in wet season. Therefore, I compute wet sea-
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Figure 1.4: Local polynomial smoothing
Note: Author calculates the share of land by top 10% biggest farms based on 2005 India
Agricultural census. NREGA implementation is measured by the share of households
provided with public jobs. Kernel = epanechnikov, degree=3, bandwidth=.09.
son precipitation by aggregating the amount of precipitation between June and
November in the study year. Figure A.4 in Appendix presents annual rainfall
deviation in the country. Soil information is obtained from Food and Agricul-
ture Organization (FAO) Digital Soil Map of the World and Derived Soil Prop-
erties (CDROM). I map geographical coordinates to district level soil texture.
Table 1.3 shows that 91% of the land contains medium or fine level soil; 9% of
land is covered by course soil.
Compiling these data sets into a district-wise panel is complicated by district
jurisdictional changes during 2001-2011. There were 640 districts in 2011, as
opposed to 593 districts in 2001 (Census, 2011). In the analysis, districts with
boundary changes are excluded, although results are robust to adding these
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Table 1.3: Descriptives of land inequality and demographic information
mean sd min max
Gini coef. 0.47 (0.08) 0 1
Rural area (Sq. km) 5044.34 (4862.42) 119 45382
wet season rainfall (100 mm) 1.03 (0.69) 0 6
% of land covered in fine soil 20.08 (24.19) 0 97
% of land covered in medium soil 70.70 (27.68) 0 100
% of Rural pop 77.94 (15.42) 12 100
Literacy rate 65.29 (11.70) 31 97
% of SC population 15.84 (8.84) 0 50
% of ST population 15.89 (26.18) 0 98
Work-population ratio 40.91 (6.98) 24 63
% of Main workers 30.68 (5.95) 17 52
% of Marginal workers 10.23 (4.20) 2 24
% of Agricultural labourers 22.63 (12.98) 1 63
% of Cultivators 37.77 (18.04) 1 82
% of Household industry workers 4.05 (3.89) 1 31
% of Other industries 35.60 (17.71) 8 91
% villages with Safe Drinking water 96.19 (10.49) 24 100
% villages with Electricity (Power Supply) 84.76 (18.89) 10 100
% villages with Paved approach road 60.87 (25.51) 12 100
% villages with Primary school 84.35 (14.15) 31 100
% villages with Medical facility 41.82 (25.66) 3 100
% villages with Post and telephone facility 52.43 (26.81) 4 100
Observations 416
Total workers = main workers + marginal workers = Ag laborers + cultivators + household in-
dustry workers + Other workers. Main workers were those engaged in any economically pro-
ductive activity for 183 days or more during the year. Marginal workers were those who worked
for less than 183 days. A person was considered as cultivator if he or she was engaged either as
employer, single worker or family worker in cultivation of land owned or held from government
(or private persons, institutions). A person was regarded as an agricultural labourer if she/he
worked in another person’s land for wages in cash, kind or share.
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districts back. The final sample includes 416 districts at 2001 district level.7
1.6 Empirical Model and Results
1.6.1 OLS Results
I examine the effect of land inequality on public works provision by pooling
the NREGA implementation data during 2006-2010 and using across district
(within-state) variations of land concentration in 2005.8 The model specification
is:
Yit = α0+β∗INEi,2005+αXit+αsDstate+αtDt+εit,∀t ∈ {2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010}
(1.1)
where β is the coefficient of interest.
INEi,2005 denotes land inequality in district i in 2005, measured by Gini co-
efficient (in logarithm). Yit denotes the implementation of the NREGA program
in district i in year t, measured by proportions of rural households provided
with NREGA employment (in logarithm). A negative sign of β means NREGA
job provision is negatively associated with land inequality. Standard errors are
clustered at the district level.
7This seemingly much smaller number relevant to total Indian districts is a consequence of
combining different data sources, each of which has some missing districts. First, 2005 Agricul-
ture Census only contains 528 districts (as Maharashtra state is not included), about 90 of which
are either newly created or the original districts that got split. These 90 districts are dropped
when I combine Agriculture census to 2001 population census. Second, 26 districts that are in-
cluded in Agriculture census are not included in NREGA public portal (and this public portal
posts information at 2010 district level). Third, about 10 districts lack information on soil quality
or rural area size etc that further reduces the number of observations. In the end, we have 416
districts for each year at 2001 district level.
8Table A.2 shows that land distribution didn’t change at statistically significant level during
2005 and 2010.
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To identify the effect of the concentration of land ownership on public works
provision, β, I need to control for variables that are correlated with land in-
equality and at the same time affect NREGA implementation. The first set of
confounding factors contains the capacity of local governments to accommo-
date job supply to job demand. As mentioned in the previous section, although
central government bears most of the cost, it does not imply there will be zero
cost to local governments when employing workers under NREGA. The imple-
mentation cost may be particularly high in poor districts (Dutta et al., 2014).
Therefore, I control for variables reflecting the level of local economic devel-
opment to capture local governments’ accommodation capability, such as the
percentage of villages that have access to drinking water, electricity, paved road
and schools in the district and other rural infrastructure variables.
In the same vein, I also control for “Backwardness Index”, a score con-
structed by Indian planning commission in 2003, with smaller numbers mean-
ing being more backward. The literature has shown that NREGA program rolls
out from backward districts to more affluent districts, in the order of their rank-
ings on this index(Zimmermann, 2012; Dasgupta et al., 2017). However, this
roll-out rule is not absolutely enforced, reflected by the fact that many Phase
2 districts have smaller values of backwardness index than Phase 1 districts.
Therefore, I also include phase dummies to capture the heterogeneous imple-
mentation by phases.
In addition, the model also includes soil texture and the current wet sea-
son’s rainfall deviations from historical means, because these geographic vari-
ables could affect both the demand for and the supply of NREGA jobs, and are
also documented to be associated with land distribution. 9 I also include a vec-
9This relation between geographic and climate information and land ownership distribution
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tor of state dummy, Dstate, and year dummy, Dt, restricting the cross-sectional
comparisons to within-state variations.
The results of OLS estimates are presented in Table 1.4. It gives a significantly
negative relation between Gini coefficient and the proportion of rural house-
holds provided with NREGA employment. The results are robust to adding
extra covariates. Column 4 suggests, districts with a 1% (or in absolute term,
0.0047) higher Gini coefficient would have 0.6% (or in absolute term, 0.006 *
30=1.8 percentage points) fewer households provided with NREGA jobs.
1.6.2 Addressing Endogeneity
OLS estimates cannot be interpreted as causal. The most apparent threat is
reverse causality, as redistributive policies such as public works schemes also
shape inequality. Using land inequality in 2005 (much ahead of the initiation
of NREGA) allows for some control of potential reverse causality (i.e. it’s rea-
sonable that land inequality in 2005 will affect public work provision in post-
2006, but unlikely that public works in post-2006 will affect land inequality in
2005). However, the model will still capture some endogeneity issues if there
are some omitted variables which are correlated with both land ownership and
the demand/supply side of NREGA implementation. For instance, adverse ge-
ographical and climatic characteristics may concentrate land ownership by re-
is established by existing studies that use various geographical conditions to instrument for land
inequality, including climatic information, soil quality and the share of cash crop (inequality-
rising) and wheat/rice crop etc. (e.g. Easterly, 2007; Sokoloff and Engerman, 2000; Galor et al.,
2009; Ramcharan, 2010; Cinnirella and Hornung, 2016; Baten and Juif, 2014). The spirits of
these IVs are, small farmers are usually less able to hedge against negative weather shocks, and
have a smaller demand for land in areas with poor soil quality (or in areas with violent rainfall
variability). Thus, regions with poorer soil quality (or more rain variability) have higher land
concentration.
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Table 1.4: Dep var: % of households provided with NREGA jobs (OLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS OLS OLS
Gini coef. (log) -0.642** -0.645** -0.632** -0.638**
(0.292) (0.273) (0.289) (0.273)
log rural area(Sq. km) 0.291*** 0.328*** 0.293***
(0.097) (0.098) (0.097)
log Rural population -0.243*** -0.204** -0.241***
(0.083) (0.089) (0.083)
Literacy rate -1.040*** -1.097*** -1.017***
(0.345) (0.390) (0.344)
Wet season rainfall deviation -0.092** -0.094** -0.092**
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
% of land covered in fine soil -0.272 -0.519** -0.287
(0.208) (0.222) (0.209)
% of land covered in medium soil -0.375** -0.556*** -0.402**
(0.155) (0.175) (0.155)
% of Agricultural labourers 1.708*** 2.087*** 1.733***
(0.456) (0.467) (0.457)
% of Main workers -0.206 0.099 -0.228
(0.748) (0.839) (0.745)
% of Marginal workers 1.202 1.826** 1.255
(0.784) (0.918) (0.791)
% of SCST population 0.850*** 1.472*** 0.927***
(0.264) (0.263) (0.266)
% villages with Safe Drinking water 1.365 1.880 1.448
(1.209) (1.263) (1.220)
% villages with Electricity (Power Supply) 0.565** 0.512* 0.528*
(0.280) (0.289) (0.282)
% villages with Paved approach road -0.609** -0.841*** -0.629**
(0.277) (0.295) (0.278)
% villages with Primary school 0.084 0.185 0.080
(0.328) (0.343) (0.329)
% villages with Medical facility -0.505 -0.605 -0.501
(0.398) (0.401) (0.400)
% villages with Post and telephone facility -0.366 -0.390 -0.365
(0.247) (0.261) (0.249)
Phase 2 indicator -0.179** -0.182**
(0.071) (0.071)
Phase 3 indicator -0.519*** -0.526***
(0.082) (0.082)
Composite Backwardness Index 0.041 0.100
(0.095) (0.090)
State Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1224 1224 1224 1224
R square 0.45 0.67 0.65 0.67
Notes: Dependent variable is the logarithm of the share of households provided with NREGA
jobs in the district. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at district level. * p < 0.10, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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ducing the demand for land by marginal farmers9 ; and meanwhile adverse
geographical and climatic characteristics may increase the demand for NREGA
jobs and decrease the government capability to supply jobs. Although I have
included the covariates of soil texture and rainfall variations, if there are other
such geographical and climatic variables omitted, OLS estimates will be biased
(upward and toward zero in the given example). In addition to omitted variable
bias, there is also measurement error of land distribution, which will lead to the
attenuation bias of the estimates.
I address the endogeneity issues by taking advantage of historical institu-
tions in India — land revenue collection system, established by British colo-
nial rulers during 1750-1861. This variable is constructed based on the study
by Banerjee and Iyer (2005). Land revenue, or land tax, was the major source of
government revenue in India and during British times as well. British admin-
istration established three systems to collect land revenue in all cultivable land
in British India: (a) landlord-based system, where the liability for a village or a
group of villages lay with with a single landlord; (b) an individual cultivator-
based system, where revenue settlements was made directly with individual
cultivators; (c) village-based system, where village bodies which jointly owned
the village were responsible for the land revenue. Figure A.3 in the appendix
presents the map of these three different land revenue systems in British India.
System (c), village-based system, could be further grouped as either system (a)
or (b), depending on whether the village body was a single landlord or a large
number of members with each person being responsible for a fixed share of the
revenue. Table 1.5 presents state-wise distribution of landlord and non-landlord
districts.
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Table 1.5: State-wise distribution of landlord and non-landlord districts
Landlord Non-landlord Total districts Mean landlord proportion
Andhra Pradesh 2 8 10 0.34
Bihar 1 0 1 1
Chhattisgarh 4 1 5 0.80
Gujarat 0 6 6 0
Haryana 0 4 4 0.15
Karnataka 0 11 11 0
Madhya Pradesh 10 1 11 0.89
Odisha 6 2 8 0.68
Punjab 0 5 5 0.14
Rajasthan 1 0 1 1
Tamil Nadu 2 9 11 0.28
Uttar Pradesh 12 34 46 0.59
Uttarakhand 0 3 3 0.38
West Bengal 10 0 10 1
Total 48 84 132 0.51
Source: This is a subsample of districts from the study by Banerjee and Iyer (2005).
To identify a causal relation between land distribution and the provision of
public works under NREGA, I use the binary indicator of land revenue system
— whether this district was a landlord district in British India — to instrument
for land inequality in 2005. The instrumental variable strategy relies on the as-
sumption that land revenue collection system under British India only affects
redistributive policies through contemporary and current land inequality, after
controlling for all observables. This is plausible because the way that British
colonial rulers decided land revenue system in different areas was not based on
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Figure 1.5: Visualize first stage —Land Inequality (Gini coefficient) in
landlord/non-landlord districts
Source: The author calculated land ownership Gini coefficient based on 2005 India Agricultural
census.
a hard rule, i.e. in terms of land fertility, weather or labor productivity (Baner-
jee and Iyer, 2005). Figure 1.5 visually presents the negative relation between
landlord-dominated revenue collection system and current land inequality.
I estimate first stage relation using the following equation:
INEi,2005 = α
′
0 + ρZi + α
′Xit + α′sDstate + α
′
tDt + ηit (1.2)
where Zi is the binary indicator that equals to 1 if district i used to be a landlord-
dominated district in British India, and zero otherwise; INEi,2005 denotes land
inequality in district i in 2005, measured by Gini coefficient;Xi denotes the same
vector of district-wise covariates as in Equation(1.1).10
10By restricting the variations to be within-state, in this IV estimation, states where land tenure
systems don’t vary across districts within the state will be absorbed in the state fixed effects,
such as Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka, Punjab, Rajasthan, Uttarakhand and West Bengal.
As a result, 91 districts in 6 states are left and contribute to the variations in the IV estimation.
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Figure 1.6: Trends of Land Inequality (share of land by top 10% land hold-
ings) in landlord/nonlandlord districts
Source: Land reform data during 1957-1992 are from (Besley and Burgess, 2000). Data on Land
revenue system are from (Banerjee and Iyer, 2005).
The first-stage conditional correlations suggest that landlord-dominated dis-
tricts have 7.4% lower Gini land ownership inequality in 2005 (Table 1.6). This
estimated effect is equivalent to -0.035 (= -7.4% * 0.47) in absolute term of gini
coefficient, or 0.5 (=0.035/0.08) standard deviation of gini coefficient, consid-
ering that the mean and standard deviation of Gini coefficient are respectively
0.47 and 0.08 in the sample.
The first-stage result that previously landlord-dominated districts in British
India has a lower land inequality today is consistent with the study by Banerjee
and Iyer (2005). They show that states with a higher landlord proportion had
higher Gini measures of land ownership inequality in 1885, and this inequality
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persisted until the end of the colonial period11. However, as they argue, ma-
jor landlord-dominated states enacted 6.5 land reforms in the period between
1957-1992, while non-landlord states had an average of 3.5. According to Besley
and Burgess (2000), states that enacted a larger number of land reforms had a
greater decline of Gini coefficient of land inequality. Therefore, with this chain
of reasoning, landlord district saw a greater decline of land inequality than non-
landlord districts, driven by a great number of land reforms after Indian Inde-
pendence. Furthermore, the negative sign of first-stage results is consistent with
the study by (Besley et al., 2016) that shows in the long-run land inequality is
lower in areas that saw greater intensity of tenancy reform.
I then plot the numbers of land reforms over time in major landlord and non-
landlord states in Figure 1.7, which provides consistent evidence with the litera-
ture that landlord areas enacted more frequent land reforms than non-landlord
areas.12 To depict when land ownership distribution in landlord dominated dis-
tricts started to become more equal than non-landlord dominated districts, I
further plot the trends of land inequality, measured by the share of land owned
by the top 10% land holdings, for major landlord and non-landlord districts in
Figure 1.6.13 It shows that the shift of landlord districts from having relatively
high land inequality to relatively low land inequality occurred in 1970. Inter-
11 Banerjee and Iyer (2005) explains why the choice of landlord revenue system had a strong
effect on the distribution of land and wealth in British India period. “Under landlord-based
systems, the landlords were given a more or less free hand to set the terms for the tenants and,
as a result, they were in a position to appropriate most of the gains in productivity.”
12I calculate these two series of numbers by combining state-wise land reform data
from (Besley and Burgess, 2000) into the current district-wise sample. Major landlord-
dominated areas are states with an above-median share of districts belonging to landlord dom-
inated districts.
13Ideally, I need district-wise land inequality to plot the changes of land inequality over time
in landlord versus non-landlord districts. However, the lack of district-wise land distribution
data prevents me from doing so. Instead, by combining with state-wise data on land reform and
land distribution from Besley and Burgess (2000), I plot these trends for major landlord states
and non-landlord states, where landlord states are defined as states with an above-median share
of districts belonging to landlord dominated districts, and non-landlord states.
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estingly, this turning point coincides with the time when major landlord states
started to outnumber non-landlord states in land reforms as shown in the Fig-
ure 1.7. All such information together explains the negative sign of first-stage
estimate—landlord districts, although starting with higher land inequality in
British Indian period, enacted more land reforms after Indian Independence,
and hence ended up having lower land inequality in 2005.
The instrumental variable strategy relies on the assumption that land rev-
enue collection system under British India only affects redistributive policies
through contemporary and current land inequality, after controlling for observ-
ables. However, if different historical property rights institutions lead to persis-
tent unobserved culture and institutional outcomes, and such unobserved out-
comes are also correlated with redistributive policies, then this IV would violate
the exclusion condition. I will examine the sensitivity of the estimations to the
degree in which the exclusion restriction is potentially violated using sensitivity
analysis proposed in Conley et al. (2012).
1.6.3 IV Results
Table 1.7 presents two-stage least square (2SLS) estimations of the effect of land
inequality on NREGA implementation (measured by proportions of household
provided with NREGA jobs). The sample size drops to one third of the origi-
nal size, because the instrumental variable, landlord versus non-landlord domi-
nated districts indicator, is only defined in districts that were under British India
during 1850-1947.
Restricting the sample to the IV sample, column 1 shows OLS results with
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Table 1.6: Dep var: Land inequality (gini coefficient) in 2005, (First stage)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS OLS OLS
Landlord district indicator -0.079*** -0.082*** -0.074*** -0.074***
(0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
log rural area(Sq. km) 0.037 0.043 0.041
(0.031) (0.030) (0.028)
log Rural population -0.010 -0.021 -0.020
(0.040) (0.036) (0.037)
Literacy rate -0.013 -0.002 -0.006
(0.125) (0.108) (0.122)
Wet season rainfall deviation -0.007** -0.007** -0.007**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
% of land covered in fine soil -0.478*** -0.490*** -0.495***
(0.073) (0.067) (0.072)
% of land covered in medium soil -0.243*** -0.259*** -0.263***
(0.059) (0.056) (0.057)
% of Agricultural labourers 0.144 0.178* 0.181*
(0.101) (0.097) (0.100)
% of Main workers 0.558** 0.485** 0.489**
(0.231) (0.209) (0.225)
% of Marginal workers 0.081 0.122 0.100
(0.296) (0.261) (0.296)
% of SCST population -0.110 -0.065 -0.063
(0.114) (0.106) (0.116)
% villages with Safe Drinking water -0.433 -0.408 -0.368
(0.410) (0.388) (0.416)
% villages with Electricity (Power Supply) -0.031 -0.046 -0.047
(0.092) (0.089) (0.092)
% villages with Paved approach road 0.171** 0.161** 0.165**
(0.083) (0.077) (0.080)
% villages with Primary school 0.127 0.117 0.112
(0.092) (0.085) (0.085)
% villages with Medical facility 0.011 0.009 0.007
(0.057) (0.059) (0.058)
% villages with Post and telephone facility 0.001 0.003 0.004
(0.070) (0.068) (0.067)
Phase 2 indicator -0.002 -0.005
(0.021) (0.021)
Phase 3 indicator 0.010 0.000
(0.023) (0.022)
Backwardness Index 0.067*** 0.066***
(0.018) (0.017)
State Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 570 570 570 570
R square 0.63 0.80 0.81 0.81
F test: landlord indicator coef=0 14.21 17.13 14.12 14.28
Notes: “Landlord district indicator” equals 1 if the district in question was a landlord district
(i.e. landlords were responsible for collecting land revenue) in British Raj. Land Gini coefficient
is constructed using 2005 Indian Agricultural census. All models include year dummy. Standard
errors are clustered at district level. * p < 0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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a full set of control variables, as a reference to 2SLS estimates. It suggests that
a 1% increase in gini coefficient of land ownership is associated with a 1.7% (or
equivalent to 0.5 percentage points, given that the average share of households
provided with NREGA jobs is 30%) decrease of the share of households pro-
vided with NREGA jobs. Column 2-5 present IV estimates with different sets
of covariates added. First-stage F statistics are all above 10, suggesting a rejec-
tion of weak instrument null hypothesis. The size of the point estimate for the
Gini coefficient is relatively stable over the last four IV specifications, suggesting
that a 1% increase in gini coefficient of land ownership would have decreased
the share of households provided with NREGA jobs by 5% (or equivalent to 1.5
percentage points, given that the average share of households provided with
NREGA jobs is 30%).
Column 3 in Table 1.7 adds various variables that reflect the demand for
and the supply of NREGA jobs. It suggests soil quality and some rural infras-
tructure are negatively associated with public works provision. For instance, a
1% higher proportion of land covered by fine soil rather than coarse soil in the
district is associated with a 2% lower participation by households. Similarly,
a 1% higher proportion of villages having access to post and telephone facility
is associated with a 1% lower participation by households. Such evidence is
consistent the demand-driven nature of NREGA — areas with favorable agri-
cultural conditions may not need the job protection by NREGA, because there
are already enough jobs in rural labor market. The negative relation may also
be because the central government allocates less public employment in those
relatively better endowed and more developed areas.
Column 3 also contains two Phase indicators, using Phase 1 as the reference
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Table 1.7: Dep var: % of households provided with NREGA jobs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Gini coef. (log) -1.711*** -4.892** -4.558*** -4.844*** -5.124***
(0.557) (1.916) (1.508) (1.647) (1.741)
log rural area(Sq. km) 0.626*** 0.711*** 0.862*** 0.767***
(0.232) (0.241) (0.209) (0.238)
log Rural population -0.429** -0.509*** -0.444** -0.577***
(0.170) (0.178) (0.179) (0.182)
Literacy rate -0.433 -0.384 0.381 -0.349
(0.653) (0.739) (0.750) (0.780)
Wet season rainfall deviation -0.067 -0.091 -0.092 -0.092
(0.062) (0.061) (0.063) (0.063)
% of land covered in fine soil -0.939* -2.130*** -2.311*** -2.517***
(0.521) (0.715) (0.772) (0.823)
% of land covered in medium soil -0.563* -1.250*** -1.352*** -1.512***
(0.340) (0.456) (0.483) (0.508)
% of Agricultural labourers 2.393*** 2.924*** 3.681*** 3.270***
(0.820) (0.913) (1.016) (1.012)
% of Main workers -0.292 1.303 2.572 1.193
(1.802) (1.969) (2.035) (2.061)
% of Marginal workers -1.493 -1.299 1.070 -1.207
(1.692) (1.910) (1.991) (2.068)
% of SCST population 0.339 -0.205 0.536 -0.014
(0.519) (0.550) (0.647) (0.586)
% villages with Safe Drinking water 1.035 -0.333 0.226 -0.291
(3.443) (3.497) (3.640) (3.611)
% villages with Electricity (Power Supply) 0.546 0.601 0.247 0.461
(0.424) (0.556) (0.579) (0.576)
% villages with Paved approach road -0.877* -0.257 -0.593 -0.208
(0.450) (0.539) (0.544) (0.562)
% villages with Primary school 1.194*** 1.521*** 1.739*** 1.517***
(0.432) (0.436) (0.449) (0.448)
% villages with Medical facility -0.564 -0.547 -0.556 -0.563
(0.464) (0.451) (0.487) (0.446)
% villages with Post and telephone facility -1.236*** -1.291*** -1.475*** -1.267***
(0.413) (0.388) (0.406) (0.397)
Phase 2 indicator -0.342*** -0.351** -0.370***
(0.124) (0.137) (0.141)
Phase 3 indicator -0.541*** -0.487*** -0.547***
(0.145) (0.150) (0.159)
Composite Backwardness Index 0.138 0.292 0.419**
(0.165) (0.209) (0.178)
State Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 457 457 457 457 457
First-stage F statistics 14.26 17.58 14.65 15.02
Notes: Column 1 shows OLS results; Column 2-5 present IV estimates with different sets of covariates
added. Dependent variable is proportions of household provided with NREGA jobs in each year 2006-2010.
District-wise land Gini coefficient is constructed using 2005 Indian Agricultural census. Instrumental vari-
able is a binary indicator that equals 1 if the district in question was a landlord district (i.e. landlords were
responsible for collecting land revenue) in British Raj. All models include year and state dummy. Standard
errors are clustered at district level. * p < 0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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group. The estimated coefficients of Phase 2 and Phase 3 indicator are both neg-
ative, with the former having a smaller magnitude than the latter. This suggests
that Phase 1 districts have the highest level of public employment provided,
followed by Phase 2 districts and then Phase 3 districts. This relative position
resonates with the fact that NREGA rolls out from the most backward districts
to richer districts.
Column 4 replaces Phase dummies with “Backwardness Index”, which cap-
tures how the program was rolled out. Column 5 adds both Phase dummies and
Backwardness Index. Backwardness Index (a greater value indicating economi-
cally more developed) is expected to be negatively related to job provision, be-
cause more NREGA jobs are demanded in backward areas. However, both col-
umn 4 and column 5 suggest a positive relation between this index and NREGA
job provision, although not at a statistically significant level. This positive rela-
tion may be because the higher demand in the backward areas is dominated by
the lower capacity to accommodate NREGA projects. In addition, the magni-
tude of the estimated effect of land inequality on NREGA provision is slightly
bigger in column 5 than that in column 3.
To put these results into perspective, consider the difference between land
inequality Gini coefficient in two districts in Uttar Pradesh, Ballia and Alla-
habad. In Ballia, gini coefficient of land ownership was 0.486 (which is at the
50th percentile of the distribution of gini coefficient) in 2005, and in Allahabad,
this number is 0.519 (which is at the 80th percentile). Using the estimates in col-
umn (5), the difference of 0.033 points, or 6.6% (= 0.033/0.518), in gini coefficient
implies that 33% (=6.6 * 5 % ) more households would have been provided with
NREGA jobs in Allahabad if it had a land gini coefficient as small as Bellia’s.
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Considering the shares of households provided with NREGA jobs are, respec-
tively, 22 percent in Bellia and 12 percent in Allahabad, this 33% increase would
have eliminated one third (=33% * 12 / (22-12)) of the actual gap in job allocation
rates between these two districts.
Both OLS and 2SLS estimations suggest a negative relation between land in-
equality and NREGA provision. In terms of the magnitude, 2SLS coefficient is
about 3.8 times the OLS coefficient, suggesting that OLS results are biased up-
ward (toward finding zero effect). A simple and possible source of endogeneity
that leads to the upward bias of OLS results is measurement error in land own-
ership distributions. As I approximate the size of land by the average size of
land holdings in the size bin it belongs to, it unavoidably creates noise. Another
source of bias might be some omitted variables that lead to less job provision
in more equal areas. The three-times difference between IV estimates and OLS
estimates is also in line with other studies that use geographical conditions to
instrument for land inequality (Easterly, 2007; Cinnirella and Hornung, 2016;
Ramcharan, 2010).
It’s noted that I take the logarithm of the dependent variable and gini coef-
ficient of land ownership so that the estimated effect can be easily interpreted
as percent changes. This is especially convenient when we compare estimates
across different measurements of NREGA implementation in the robustness
check section. The disadvantage of taking logarithm lies in losing more than
100 observations that have zero NREGA jobs provided, most of which are Phase
2 and Phase 3 districts before 2007. Therefore, to address the concern that the
estimated results may be driven by sample selections, I use level regressions
which will include districts that have zero NREGA jobs provided as well. The
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estimates are provided in Table A.3 in the Appendix. The level of dependent
variable and gini coefficient here are standardized by the standard deviation
of the sample observations. Column 5 suggests that a 1 standard deviation in-
crease of gini coefficient is associated with 0.7 standard deviation decline of the
share of households provided with NREGA jobs.
1.7 Robustness of the Identification
1.7.1 Robustness to Violations of Perfect Exogeneity
The credibility of 2SLS estimations rests on the identification assumption that
the historical institution of landlord versus non-landlord dominated areas does
not directly relate to the provision of public works other than through land dis-
tribution. However, this instrument variable may only be plausibly exogenous
rather than perfectly exogenous. To gain a sense about the sensitivity of the es-
timated effect to the relaxation of perfect exogeneity conditions, I examine the
bounds that we can place on the true effect of land inequality on public works
provision, following the method proposed by Conley et al. (2012). This method
has been used in other studies to examine the sensitivity of estimation results to
the violations of exogeneity conditions (e.g. Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011; Ding
et al., 2009).
This method relaxes IV exclusion restriction by allowing the instrument vari-
able to also enter linearly in the second-stage regression with a coefficient γ 14.
14The following equation is a generalization of this method proposed by Conley et al. (2012).
Y = βX + γZ + ε
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Conley et al. (2012) show how to obtain the bounds for the IV estimate of the
effect of interest (in the current paper, the effect of land inequality on public
works provision, β) with prior information or assumptions about γ.
Applying the “Union of intervals” approach proposed by Conley et al. (2012)
to the current paper, I find that if γ < 0, the bounds of β are actually further
away from zero relative to the IV estimate of β which assumes perfect exogene-
ity (i.e. γ = 0). In other words, if landlord-dominated areas are still associated
with less NREGA employment even after controlling for all covariates (which
is likely if we regard public work projects as one kind of public investments
and follow the argument by Banerjee and Iyer (2005) that landlord areas have
lower public expenditures today), then IV estimates provide an underestima-
tion (in terms of absolute value) of the true effect of land inequality on NREGA
job provision.
Applying the same “Union of intervals” approach, I find that if γ > 0, the
bounds of β will be closer toward zero relative to the IV estimate of β, and there-
fore IV estimates provide an overestimation (in terms of the magnitude) of the
true effect. In other words, if landlord-dominated areas are still associated with
more public employment even after controlling for all covariates, then IV esti-
mates provide an overestimation (in terms of absolute value) of the true effect of
land inequality on NREGA job provision. A such example is that the relatively
backward landlord areas have a higher demand for public jobs for reasons not
captured by the model. Figure 1.8 plots 95% confidence intervals for an array of
assumptions about prior information of γ — the support of γ is assumed to be
where γ reflects how close the exclusion restriction is satisfied. Without prior information or
assumptions about γ, the parameters β and γ can not be jointly identified. The IV exclusion
restriction is equivalent to the prior belief that γ = 0. The definition of plausible exogeneity is
having prior information that implies γ is near 0 but perhaps not exactly 0.
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[0, δ]. Because no distribution about the prior information is assumed in “Union
of intervals” approach, this approach provides a conservative estimate of the
bounds. For the 95% confidence interval of β to include zero, γ must be above
0.2. Now the question is, how likely will γ be above 0.2? I was trying to esti-
mate γ by extracting a subsample which has the same level of land inequality
and then regressing Y on Z and all other covariates. However, the small sample
nature of the data set in this paper doesn’t support this estimation.
To gain a deeper insight on the direction of the potential bias (the sign of γ ),
I compare economic development variables in landlord-dominated versus non-
landlord-dominated districts, as shown in Appendix Table A.1. It shows that
landlord-dominated areas are more backward today, with smaller proportions
of villages having access to safe drinking water, electricity, paved road, medical
facility, post and telephone facility, having lower labor productivity and agricul-
tural wages. The underdevelopment in landlord districts could potentially not
only lead to a higher demand for public jobs, but also a lower local capability to
supply public jobs. Therefore, I cannot conclude from this comparison in which
direction landlord areas are associated with NREGA job provision (i.e. the sign
of γ is still unclear), which is especially because the empirical model already
controls for all these observed economic development variables.
What I can conclude from this robustness check is, the true effect of land in-
equality on NREGA job provision will be stronger if landlord areas are directly
associated with less NREGA provision through other mechanisms than land
distribution. In the opposite, the true effect will be smaller if landlord areas are
associated with more NREGA provision through other mechanisms than land
distribution.
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Figure 1.7: Frequencies of land reforms
Source: Besley and Burgess (2000) provides information on the cumulative number of land
reforms at state level. This figure plots reform frequencies by whether this state has an above-
median or below-median share of districts that used to belong to “landlord-dominated” areas
in British India.
1.7.2 Alternative Measurements of NREGA Implementations
Both the OLS and IV results presented in the previous section use proportions of
households provided with public employment to measure NREGA implemen-
tations. Table 1.8 presents estimates using alternative measurements of public
works implementation — respectively, per capita labor expenditure, average
days of employment provided per person in either Schedule Caste or Schedule
Tribe, and the total number of completed works per rural person.
Panel A shows OLS results using the full sample. Panel B and C present OLS
estimates and IV estimates using the IV sample. The instrumental variable is
still the binary indicator that equals 1 if the district used to be a landlord district
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Figure 1.8: Plausibly exogenous bounds: Union of Intervals approach
This figure presents 95% confidence intervals for the effect of land inequality on shares of house-
holds provided with public works using unions of intervals approach (Conley et al., 2012). The
confidence interval imposes the prior information that the support of γ, the sign on the instru-
ment, is the interval γ ∼ [0, δ].
in British Raj. The sample size drops in the IV sample because I have historical
data on land tenure only for British districts. OLS results using the full sample
show 0.4-1 percent decrease in districts with a 1 percent higher Gini coefficient.
OLS results in the IV sample show a slightly higher effect, around 1 percent.
2SLS results give an even higher estimate for Gini coefficient, between 3-6 per-
cents. The results using these alternative measurements are overall consistent
with the estimates using household participation rate in NREGA.
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Table 1.8: Robustness checks: Alternative measurements of NREGA im-
plementation
(1) (2) (3)
Labor Expenditure Persondays # of projects
Panel A: OLS using the full sample
Gini coef. (log) -0.523* -0.476* -0.992***
(0.288) (0.276) (0.375)
Observations 1223 1179 1199
R square 0.81 0.66 0.45
Panel B: OLS using the IV sample
Gini coef. (log) -1.172* -1.181* -1.137
(0.685) (0.704) (1.109)
Observations 456 449 452
R square 0.83 0.68 0.45
Panel C: 2SLS
Gini coef. (log) -3.638* -3.177* -5.789
(1.946) (1.798) (3.623)
Observations 456 449 452
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistics 15.03 14.85 14.17
Notes: The table shows district-level OLS and IV estimates using three alternative measurements
of NREGA implementation. The dependent variables in each model are, respectively, (log) per
capita labor expenditure, (log) average days that each person in Schedule Caste or Schedule Tribe
worked in NREGA, (log) total number of completed works per rural person. Panel A shows OLS
results using the full sample. Panel B shows OLS results using the IV sample. Panel C shows
2SLS estimates, where the instrumental variable is the binary indicator that equals 1 if the district
used to be a landlord district (i.e. landlords were responsible for collecting land revenue collec-
tion) in British Raj. All specifications include a full set of covariates, including year and state
fixed effects, phase indicators, backwardness index and other covariates listed in the last column
of Table 1.7. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. * p < 0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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1.7.3 Does Gini Coefficient Capture the Top Distribution?—
Alternative Measurement of Land Inequality
As Gini coefficients of land ownership reflect the whole distribution of land
holdings, a natural question arises—does gini coefficient capture the top dis-
tribution of land ownership? It is after all the top, rather than the middle
or bottom, distribution of land holdings that reflects the concentration of big
farms and big landlords’ political power. Therefore, I construct shares of land
owned by the top 10% largest land holdings to measure land inequality, follow-
ing Besley and Burgess (2000). As mentioned in previous section, land distri-
bution data has information on the number and area of operational holdings
across the following size bins (in 1000 hectares): below 0.5; 0.5-1; 1-2; 2-3; 3-4;
4-5; 5-7.5; 7.5-10; 10-20; 20 & above. I use the average size of land holdings in
each bin to proximate land size in each group, then calculate shares of operated
area for each decile of holdings. Figure 1.2 shows that the largest 10 percent of
landlords own about 46 percent of the land area nationwide.
The scatter plot of Gini coefficient and the shares of land owned by the top
10% land holdings in Figure 1.9 shows that these two measurements of land in-
equality have the same trends. The shares of land owned by the top 10% land
holdings are higher wherever Gini coefficients are greater. This provides de-
scriptive support that differences in Gini coefficients between districts are able
to capture the relative differences of large landlords’ land holdings. Then I use
this alternative inequality measurement of land ownership distribution to re-
estimate the effect of land inequality on public works provision.
Table 1.9 presents the first-stage results, indicating landlord districts have a
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lower land inequality today. Table 1.10 present district-level OLS and IV esti-
mates using the alternative measurement of land inequality, each model using
an alternative measurement of NREGA implementation—share of households
participating in NREGA employment, per capita labor expenditure, average
days that each person in either Schedule Caste or Schedule Tribe worked in
NREGA, the total number of completed works per rural person. Panel A shows
OLS results using the full sample. Panel B and C shows OLS and 2SLS results us-
ing the IV sample, where the instrumental variable is the historical land tenure
indicator. The estimations all give negative signs on land inequality. For in-
stance, Panel C in column 1 shows when the share of land owned by the top
10% land holdings increases by 1 percent (or in the absolute term, by 0.46 per-
centage points, given the fact that the average shares of land owned by the top
10% is 46 percent), the shares of households provided with NREGA jobs will
decrease by 6 percent (or equivalent to 0.06 * 30%=1.8 percentage points, given
that the average share of households participation is 30%). In addition, similar
to using Gini coefficient as the measurement of land inequality, 2SLS estimates
have greater magnitudes than OLS estimates.
1.7.4 Is NREGA Demand Higher in More Equal Areas?
This paper mainly argues, those more equal areas have more public jobs pro-
vided to the rural poor because of the less interference of landlords, rather than
through other means such as a higher demand for jobs. The previous sections
conclude this argument by controlling for a series of demand side factors in
the empirical model such as Backwardness Index and the percentage of agricul-
tural labor. However, it is still important to examine the possibility of a higher
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Table 1.9: Robustness check: Dependent variable—Share of land by top
10% land holdings (First Stage)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS OLS OLS
Landlord district indicator -0.062*** -0.068*** -0.061*** -0.060***
(0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017)
log rural area(Sq. km) -0.015 -0.011 -0.009
(0.032) (0.032) (0.030)
log Rural population 0.050 0.048 0.039
(0.039) (0.035) (0.036)
Literacy rate 0.200* 0.216** 0.207*
(0.107) (0.089) (0.105)
Wet season rainfall deviation -0.005 -0.004 -0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
% of land covered in fine soil -0.366*** -0.402*** -0.384***
(0.076) (0.074) (0.075)
% of land covered in medium soil -0.212*** -0.243*** -0.230***
(0.065) (0.065) (0.062)
% of Agricultural labourers 0.025 0.095 0.064
(0.089) (0.087) (0.086)
% of Main workers 0.399 0.387* 0.318
(0.246) (0.220) (0.241)
% of Marginal workers 0.430 0.445* 0.443
(0.303) (0.247) (0.304)
% of SCST population -0.112 -0.040 -0.068
(0.099) (0.095) (0.100)
% villages with Safe Drinking water -0.463 -0.241 -0.418
(0.481) (0.483) (0.496)
% villages with Electricity (Power Supply) -0.167** -0.201*** -0.186**
(0.076) (0.074) (0.076)
% villages with Paved approach road 0.150** 0.143** 0.142**
(0.070) (0.062) (0.068)
% villages with Primary school -0.022 -0.045 -0.035
(0.093) (0.091) (0.087)
% villages with Medical facility -0.024 -0.034 -0.026
(0.059) (0.058) (0.059)
% villages with Post and telephone facility 0.050 0.054 0.054
(0.063) (0.065) (0.062)
Phase 2 indicator 0.007 0.004
(0.022) (0.022)
Phase 3 indicator -0.012 -0.023
(0.021) (0.022)
Composite Backwardness Index 0.063*** 0.069***
(0.017) (0.018)
State Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 457 457 457 457
R square 0.64 0.77 0.79 0.79
F test: landlord indicator coef=0 13.97 14.39 12.63 12.15
Notes: Dependent variable is the proportion of land owned by the top 10% biggest land hold-
ings, constructed using 2005 Indian Agricultural census. “Landlord district indicator” equals 1 if
the district in question was a landlord district (i.e. landlords were responsible for collecting land
revenue) in British Raj. All models include year and state fixed effects. Standard errors are clus-
tered at the district level. * p < 0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.45
Table 1.10: Robustness check: land inequality measured as the share of
land by top 10% land holdings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
% HHs participate Labor Expenditure Persondays # of projects
Panel A: OLS using the full sample
Share of land by top 10% (log) -0.595** -0.533* -0.397 -0.692*
(0.281) (0.311) (0.274) (0.404)
Observations 1224 1223 1179 1199
R square 0.67 0.65 0.66 0.45
Panel B: OLS using the IV sample
Share of land by top 10% (log) -1.435** -1.253* -0.930 -1.121
(0.567) (0.643) (0.652) (1.099)
Observations 457 456 449 452
R square 0.62 0.66 0.68 0.45
Panel C: 2SLS
Share of land by top 10% (log) -6.529*** -4.673** -4.076* -7.439*
(2.241) (2.290) (2.242) (4.440)
Observations 457 456 449 452
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistics 12.15 12.23 12.12 11.80
The table shows district-level OLS and IV estimates using the alternative measurement of land inequality, and using
four alternative measurements of NREGA implementation. District-wise land inequality is measured by “Share of land
by top 10%” — the proportion of overall land owned by top 10% biggest land holdings, constructed from 2005 Indian
Agricultural census. The dependent variables in each model are, respectively, (log) share of households participating in
NREGA employment, (log) per capita labor expenditure, (log) average days that each SC/ST person worked in NREGA,
(log) total number of completed works per rural person.
Panel A shows OLS results using the full sample. Panel B shows OLS results using the IV sample. Panel C shows 2SLS
estimates, where the instrumental variable is the binary indicator that equals 1 if the district used to be a landlord dis-
trict (i.e. landlords were responsible for collecting land revenue collection) in British Raj.
All specifications include a full set of covariates, including year and state fixed effects, phase indicators, backwardness
index and other covariates listed in the last column of Table 1.7. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. * p <
0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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demand for public jobs in areas with more equal land distributions, which will
shed light upon what is driving the smaller job provision in these areas. As the
sample size in the 2SLS estimation drops by two thirds compared to the original
OLS sample, I examine the relation between gini coefficient and economic de-
velopment indicators separately for these two samples, and then explore how
agricultural wages bias the estimated effect for each model.
The top panel in Table 1.11 shows the relation between gini coefficient and
economic development in the full sample. By some measures of economic in-
dicators, such as the fractions of villages with access to electricity, paved road
and schooling, areas with more equal land distributions (i.e. lower Gini coef-
ficients) are less developed. Backwardness Index and agricultural productivity
(Rupees per hectare), however, are about the same in areas with different levels
of Gini coefficients. In particular, agricultural wages, an important labor market
variable, are slightly higher in these more equal areas. With higher agricultural
wages in private sectors, the demand for NREGA jobs is presumably lower in
such areas, hence eliminating the concern that the higher participation rate in
these areas are caused by job demand rather than job supply. Column 1 and
2 in Table 1.12 reaffirm this argument by showing that adding the additional
covariate, agricultural wages, into the original OLS model does not change the
estimated effect much, and in fact, it slightly raises the estimate.
The second panel in Table 1.11 shows that in the IV sample, other than lit-
eracy rates and access to schools, economic characteristics do not vary by Gini
coefficient at 10% significant level. The fact that labor market characteristics are
not worse in areas with more equal land distributions teases out the possibility
that the higher NREGA participation in these equal areas is driven by a higher
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demand for public jobs. The comparisons in Column 3 and 4 (and Column 5 and
6) in Table 1.12 further reaffirm this argument by showing that adding the ad-
ditional covariate, agricultural wages, into the old OLS model (IV model) only
slightly affects the estimated effects.
The examination of the relation between Gini coefficient and economic de-
velopment also provides insight on the advantage and disadvantage of OLS
and IV estimates. As mentioned earlier, OLS estimates have the potential en-
dogeneity issue arising from unobserved geographic and climate variables. By
switching to IV estimation, I can address the endogeneity issue in this regard,
but meanwhile introduce another issue due to the change of sample represen-
tativeness. When sample size drops to 1/3, some properties of the original full
sample disappear. For instance, as column 1 in Table 1.11 shows, the more equal
areas have higher agricultural wages in the full sample but not in the IV sam-
ple. As higher agricultural wages in local markets indicate a lower demand
for NREGA jobs, the difference of this property in these two samples probably
explains why OLS estimates have smaller magnitudes than 2SLS estimates.
1.8 Conclusion
This paper studies how the concentration of land ownership, a proxy for land-
lords’ political power, affects the effective implementation of public works
schemes in the context of The National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme
in India. Using district-level data on land ownership distribution in 2005 and
NREGA implementation during 2006-2010, I find that the concentration of land
ownership causes the reduction of public works provision. OLS estimates sug-
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Table 1.12: Robustness of main effects to the control of agricultural wages
Full sample IV Subsampe
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
Gini coef. -0.64** -0.65** -1.71*** -1.52*** -5.12*** -5.22**
(0.27) (0.28) (0.56) (0.57) (1.74) (2.03)
log rural area(Sq. km) 0.29*** 0.32*** 0.63*** 0.64*** 0.77*** 0.77***
(0.10) (0.10) (0.23) (0.23) (0.24) (0.24)
log Rural population -0.24*** -0.28*** -0.43** -0.47*** -0.58*** -0.57***
(0.08) (0.09) (0.17) (0.17) (0.18) (0.18)
Literacy rate -1.02*** -1.08*** -0.43 -0.39 -0.35 -0.36
(0.34) (0.34) (0.65) (0.65) (0.78) (0.78)
Wet season rainfall deviation -0.09** -0.09** -0.07 -0.07 -0.09 -0.09
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
% of land covered in fine soil -0.29 -0.27 -0.94* -0.76 -2.52*** -2.58***
(0.21) (0.21) (0.52) (0.51) (0.82) (0.99)
% of land covered in medium soil -0.40** -0.37** -0.56* -0.41 -1.51*** -1.56**
(0.16) (0.16) (0.34) (0.35) (0.51) (0.63)
% of Agricultural labourers 1.73*** 1.62*** 2.39*** 2.31*** 3.27*** 3.30***
(0.46) (0.46) (0.82) (0.83) (1.01) (1.06)
% of Main workers -0.23 -0.43 -0.29 -0.25 1.19 1.21
(0.74) (0.75) (1.80) (1.77) (2.06) (2.09)
% of Marginal workers 1.25 1.27 -1.49 -1.61 -1.21 -1.18
(0.79) (0.78) (1.69) (1.65) (2.07) (2.11)
% of SCST population 0.93*** 0.87*** 0.34 0.34 -0.01 -0.02
(0.27) (0.26) (0.52) (0.51) (0.59) (0.59)
% villages with Safe Drinking water 1.45 1.55 1.04 0.89 -0.29 -0.28
(1.22) (1.21) (3.44) (3.42) (3.61) (3.63)
% villages with Electricity (Power Supply) 0.53* 0.49* 0.55 0.52 0.46 0.47
(0.28) (0.28) (0.42) (0.41) (0.58) (0.59)
% villages with Paved approach road -0.63** -0.57** -0.88* -0.83* -0.21 -0.21
(0.28) (0.28) (0.45) (0.44) (0.56) (0.57)
% villages with Primary school 0.08 0.02 1.19*** 1.04** 1.52*** 1.56***
(0.33) (0.33) (0.43) (0.47) (0.45) (0.49)
% villages with Medical facility -0.50 -0.46 -0.56 -0.47 -0.56 -0.58
(0.40) (0.40) (0.46) (0.49) (0.45) (0.46)
% villages with Post and telephone facility -0.36 -0.33 -1.24*** -1.20*** -1.27*** -1.27***
(0.25) (0.25) (0.41) (0.41) (0.40) (0.39)
Phase 2 indicator -0.18** -0.16** -0.34*** -0.30** -0.37*** -0.38**
(0.07) (0.07) (0.12) (0.13) (0.14) (0.16)
Phase 3 indicator -0.53*** -0.49*** -0.54*** -0.47*** -0.55*** -0.56***
(0.08) (0.09) (0.14) (0.16) (0.16) (0.18)
Composite Backwardness Index 0.10 0.15* 0.14 0.12 0.42** 0.43**
(0.09) (0.09) (0.17) (0.16) (0.18) (0.20)
Ag Wages (Rs/day, 1996) -0.29** -0.35 0.08
(0.13) (0.24) (0.35)
State Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1224 1224 457 457 457 457
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistics 15.02 11.52
Note: Column 1 restates the OLS result from Table 1.4. Column 3 and 5 restate the main results from Table 1.7.
* p < 0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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gest that a 1 percent difference of land Gini coefficient leads to a 0.6 percent gap
in NREGA provision in terms of household participation rates. To address the
potential endogeneity issue arising from measurement errors and unobserved
omitted variables, I use a historical institution as the instrument variable for
land inequality—the land revenue collection system established by British colo-
nial rulers during 1750-1861. First-stage results show that previously landlord-
dominated areas in British India has a lower land inequality today, which is be-
cause landlord districts, although starting with higher land inequality in British
Indian period, enacted a greater number of land reforms after Indian Indepen-
dence. Under the assumption that the instrument is exogenous, the IV esti-
mates confirm the negative effect of land ownership inequality on public works
schemes.
Both OLS and IV results are robust to the use of three alternative measure-
ments of public works provision: per capita labor expenditure, the average days
each person in Schedule Caste or Schedule Tribe provided with NREGA em-
ployment, and the average number of projects each rural person completes.
The results are also robust when I use the shares of land owned by the top 10%
largest farmers to measure land inequality, which more directly captures the top
distribution and large landlords’ political power. To examine the sensitivity of
the estimates to the exogeneity restriction of the instrument variable, I construct
bounds for the estimated effect by applying Conley et al. (2012). This sensitivity
analysis shows the IV results allow for a negative association between the in-
strument variable and NREGA provision, and a slight positive relation between
the IV and NREGA provision. Finally, I exclude the possibility that the higher
provision of public jobs in the more equal areas is driven by a higher demand
for public jobs, by showing that the local labor market (especially agricultural
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wages in the private sector) is not worse than that in the more unequal areas.
Investigating the relation between land inequality and public works provi-
sion is not only relevant to India, but also has policy implementations for other
developing countries, such as South Africa and Kenya, that have the dual need
for job creation and investment in public services (such as road maintenance).
More broadly, this paper adds to the discussion on how power asymmetries
could hinder policies aimed at promoting equity. To improve policy effective-
ness, the government needs to take into account asymmetries in bargaining
power, which point is highlighted in 2017 World Bank Report (Lo´pez-Calva
et al., 2017). Future research would provide a more complete understanding of
the economic consequences of land inequality, and examine how power asym-
metry begets economic inequality.
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CHAPTER 2
DOES PARTICIPATING IN PUBLIC WORKS INCREASE WAGE
BARGAINING POWER IN PRIVATE SECTORS? — EVIDENCE FROM
NATIONAL RURAL EMPLOYMENT GUARANTEE SCHEME IN INDIA
Yanan Li (Cornell University)
Yanyan Liu (International Food Policy & Research Institute)
2.1 Abstract
This paper estimates labor market effects of public works programs for partic-
ipating households in the context of the Indian National Rural Employment
Scheme (thereafter, NREGA). Our research question is twofold. First, does
working in a public work program increase an individual’s own wage bargain-
ing power in private sectors (mostly as agricultural labor)? Second, do hus-
bands’ (or wives’) participation increase their spouses’ wage bargaining power
in private sectors? We use a Difference-in-Differences method to estimate the
NREGA’s effect on participating households’ labor market outcomes.
Results show that men would receive a 7% higher wage and work 6 days less
in private market if they participate in NREGA program in the main agricultural
season; and at the same time, their wives who are not working in public works
would tend to reduce labor supply by about 6 agricultural working days and
gain agricultural daily wage 6% higher in the private labor market. This result
is consistent with a unitary household utility model and wage bargaining story:
when husbands participate in the public works program, the benefit obtained
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from this program may be transmitted to their wives, hence leading to a higher
reservation wage for the latter.
We also find heterogeneous effects by season and by participation intensity.
Men’s own wage effect and spousal wage effect only exist in the main agricul-
tural season, not in the off season, which means NREGA may bring competition
for labor with private sectors in the main agricultural season. Another interest-
ing pattern is that, as husbands work more days and receive more payment
from NREGA work, wives’ labor supply shows a stronger negative effect. This
pattern might indicate an income effect underlying these wage effects.
2.2 Introduction
Public works schemes are an important and widely used anti-poverty policy
in developing countries, aside from cash transfer. Existing studies have docu-
mented different socioeconomic effects of public works, such as poverty target-
ing effectiveness, cost-benefit analysis, agricultural productivity, children hu-
man capital investment, labor market effects and so on (e.g. Subbarao, 1997;
Del Ninno et al., 2009; Zimmermann, 2014; Imbert and Papp, 2015; Muralidha-
ran et al., 2016; Shah and Steinberg, 2015; Azam, 2011; Berg et al., 2014). Among
these studies, several have documented a positive wage effect of introducing a
public works program (Imbert and Papp, 2015; Azam, 2011; Berg et al., 2014).
An explanation for a positive wage effect is that, by providing the rural poor
with unskilled employment, especially in the agricultural lean season, public
works programs help workers to negotiate for a higher wage and better work
environment with rural landlords who are usually oligopolists in the rural labor
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market (Gaiha, 1996).
Despite the finding of a positive effect on private sector wages brought by
public works programs, there is little direct evidence showing the mechanism
of how workfare policy affects rural workers’ bargaining position. Ideally, we
want to answer this question by estimating the equilibrium parameter in a Nash
Bargaining game between workers and private sector employers (e.g. Card
et al., 2014). However, doing so requires matched employer and employee data,
and such data is usually not available in developing countries. In fact, even in
developed countries, studies also use indirect approaches to study wage bar-
gaining rather than estimate a Nash bargaining model (e.g. Ballot et al., 2006).
Along this line, the current paper provides an implicit test of the bargaining
story by estimating Average Treatment Effect on private sector wages for house-
holds participating in public works schemes.
We examine whether participating in public work opportunities increases
workers’ own bargaining power in private sectors and that of their spouses. We
hypothesize that, public works programs, serving in the role of unemployment
insurance, may pose an upward pressure on private sector wages via higher
reservation wages. Therefore, we should observe a positive wage effect in the
private agricultural market for program participants. Although we do not di-
rectly observe the bargaining parameter, such evidence of a positive wage effect
would indicate a potentially higher bargaining power for program participants.
If we further assume that husbands and wives share resources within the house-
hold, then public employment would also increase spouses’ wage bargaining
power in the private labor market.
The empirical framework employs a difference-in-differences model in the
55
context of India’s Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee
Scheme (hereafter, NREGA program). The identification assumption is that the
distribution of NREGA job opportunities is exogenous to households. In other
words, without NREGA job individual wage growths in participating and non-
participating households would have identical trends. This study takes advan-
tage of a unique data set, a combination of a household survey panel in 2005-
06 and 2007-08 and Indian administrative data that have NREGA participation
records. Compared to most existing studies that use repeated cross-sectional
NSSO employment data, the advantage of a household survey panel is that it al-
lows to control for individual specific time-invariant unobservables. Moreover,
with seasonal variations of labor market participation, we can get estimates for
pre-treatment trends.
NREGA is the world’s largest public program so far according to World Bank
report in 2015. It provides at least 100 days of guaranteed wage employment in
a financial year to each household whose adult members volunteer to do un-
skilled manual work at the minimum wage level. It focuses on unskilled work
such as water conservation, drought proofing, irrigation works and land de-
velopment. Starting from February 2006, the program had gradually expanded
throughout India by mid-2008. Like other public works program, NREGA is de-
signed to help the poor stabilize income and smooth consumption in the agricul-
tural off-peak season. About 10% of the rural labor force works in this program
sometime during the year.
Due to the self-targeting goal of NREGA, program participation is a result
of self-selection by design. This selection issue undoubtedly poses challenges
to identifying wage effects. For instance, if poorer people are more likely to
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work in the program and if they have different wage and employment paths
from richer people, then the common trend assumption underlying dif-in-dif
model may not hold. We utilize the empirical approach used in the well known
analysis of job displacement by Jacobson et al. (1993). This methodology allows
to simultaneously estimate all pre-treatment trends of outcomes in addition to
main treatment effect in current periods. If participants and nonparticipants
present similar wage growth paths prior to the introduction of NREGA, then
our estimation is less likely to be driven by self-selection.
In our main findings, we find that if husbands participate in NREGA in agri-
cultural main season, they would gain a 6 percent wage increase in the private
agricultural labor market. At the same time, their wives who are not working
in public works tend to reduce labor supply by about 6-10 agricultural working
days, and gain 7 percent higher daily wage in private labor market. This result
is consistent with a unitary household utility model and wage bargaining story.
Intuitively, when husbands participate in public works program, the benefit ob-
tained from this program may transmit to their wives as well, hence leading to
a higher reservation wage for the latter.
Another two interesting findings include heterogeneous effect by season and
by participation intensity. Specifically, men’s own wage effect and spousal wage
effect only exist in agricultural main season, not in off season. The rational is
that, in Karif/Rabi season there is already a relatively large labor demand in
private sectors, thus the introduction of NREGA program brings competition
for labor against private sector. In contract, in Summer season, labor demand
is low in private labor market, so NREGA does not result in competition with
the private market. The other interesting pattern is as husbands work more
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days and receive more payment from NREGA work, wives’ labor supply show
a stronger negative effect. This pattern may indicate income effect underlying
these wage effects. On the other hand, women’s own response is in similar
magnitude but only appears in agricultural off season. And husbands do not
respond to wives’ participation.
This paper relates to the literature of labor market impacts of workfare
schemes in low-income countries (see Devereux and Solomon, 2006). Several
studies have documented a positive earnings (or wage) effect of NREGA in agri-
cultural labor market (e.g. Basu et al., 2009; Berg et al., 2014; Imbert and Papp,
2015; Azam, 2011). They find government hiring via public works programs
may crowd out private sector work and therefore leads to a rise in equilibrium
private sector wages. However, some other studies find zero or marginal earn-
ings effect (e.g. Zimmermann, 2012). To differentiate our work from existing
literature, we need to distinguish two concepts — Average Treatment Effect
(ATE) and Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT). The former averages
treatment effect for both compliers (or participants) and noncompliers (or non-
participants in program available areas), compared to NREGA-non-available
areas. In the context of public works program (which usually has spillover ef-
fect), ATE tells two things. First, it provides a lower bound of wage effects for
the real participants (or ATT). Second, similar to general equilibrium wage ef-
fects, ATE proves estimates for wage effects regardless of participation status.
In other words, even for those who do not participate in the program, the pres-
ence of public program still has an option value of increasing reservation wages.
While most existing studies have estimated Average Treatment Effect on private
wages of public works program (e.g. Imbert and Papp, 2015; Zimmermann,
2012), this paper estimates Average Treatment Effect on actual participants to
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shed light upon wage bargaining effect.
Second, our paper is analogous to the literature of unemployment insurance
in developed countries. It is a long debate whether unemployment insurance
reduces labor supply and increases reservation wages. Using censored regres-
sion model and Heckman two-stage estimation method, previous studies find
that reservation wages of the unemployed decline 0.6 percent over time, and
drop by 15 percent when benefits are exhausted (e.g. Kiefer and Neumann, 1979;
Fishe, 1982). Consistent with the literature, our paper finds that participation in
NREGA increases both women’s and men’s agricultural wages in the private
labor market and reduces wives’ labor supply.
This paper also relates to a few other literature. The wage bargaining effect
adds a new dimension to the documented welfare effects of NREGA, includ-
ing poverty reduction Ravi and Engler (2015), welfare redistribution from rural
labor employers to workers Imbert and Papp (2015) and general welfare (e.g.
Basu and Sen, 2015). By studying how spouses respond to the partners’ partic-
ipation in public works program, our paper directly speaks to the literature of
Added Worker Effect in developed countries.
The rest of paper is organized as below. Section 3 provides background in-
formation of NREGA program implementation. Section 4 builds a theoretical
framework for this analysis. Section 5, data. Section 6, empirical model and
identification. Section 7, results. Section 8 concludes and discusses future work.
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2.3 Program Background
Here are some relevant facts about this program. NREGA is a three-phase roll-
out program, with 199 districts in Phase 1 (Feb 2006), 128 districts in Phase 2
(April 2007) and the remaining 261 districts in Phase 3 (April 2008).
This program issues a unique job card two weeks after they apply for
NREGA works and get approved. Job cards are then used to keep track of days
worked and payments received by each participant. A job card identification
number also contains the information where the household resides in, such as
state, district and village. Job card information is publicly available in NREGA
official website to protect labors against corruption and fraud.
Several households may apply for a project and then work on it together,
such as irrigation, road pavement etc. Within a household, more than one mem-
ber can work in the project at the same time.
2.3.1 Wage and Rationing of NREGA work
The average daily wage on NREGA work is 81 Rupees, as opposed to about 55
Rupees/day for women and 86 Rupees for men working as agricultural casual
labor (mostly casual labor hired by landlords).1 Thus, NREGA work is usually
seen more attractive than working as agricultural casual labor in private sector,
especially for women. This is consistent with the initial aim of this program – to
empower women by proving them employment opportunities.
Although the program asserts providing 100 days working opportunity for
1Authors’ calculation based on our sample
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each household per year, there is actually an unmet demand of work. The aver-
age working days is roughly 35 days for all members of the household during
that year.2 The rationing of demand for NREGA work is a reason that across
Indian states the number of NREGA days provided is only weakly correlated
with poverty (Dutta et al., 2012).
In terms of workers’ time allocation, most of those (above 50% based on
our survey data) who participate in NREGA work as agricultural or non-
agricultural casual labor in private sector, with only a small fraction of them
work in salary jobs.
2.3.2 Seasonality of NREGA works
There are three main agricultural seasons in India, i.e. Karif (June-Oct), Rabi
(Nov to Feb) and Summer season (March to May). Karif season is concurrent
with monsoon season, hence agricultural busy season, and has a relatively large
casual labor demand by landlords. The competition of private sector and public
sector for rural labor makes it possible for a positive wage effect of this program.
Rabi season is winter season with less labor demand in private agricultural sec-
tor. Summer season is very dry and hence agriculture lean season with little
labor demand by landlords. The introduction of NREGA program helps to sta-
bilize labor demand in lean seasons.
Figure 2.1 presents the seasonality of NREGA works in our survey districts
in Andhra Pradesh state. The number of worker-days varies by season and
month. To avoid competition with private sector labor demands, NREGA pro-
2Authors’ calculation based on our sample
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Figure 2.1: Seasonality of NREGA works, 2006.6-2008.5
gram provides more works in off-agricultural season and less in agricultural
busy season. This pattern in our data is consistent with existing studies (e.g.
Maiorano, 2014; Imbert and Papp, 2015).
2.4 Modeling and Hypothesis
We use the framework of McCall (1970)3 to show why the introduction of public
works program could increase participants’ reservation wages.
Use wr to represent reservation wage, and w actual job offer, b is the income
one can get if not working in private sector
wr − b = β
1− β
∫ ∞
0
(w − wr)dF (w) (2.1)
3These two notes are helpful. http://lhendricks.org/econ720/search/McCall_
SL.pdf and http://people.hss.caltech.edu/˜kcb/Notes/JobSearch.pdf
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To rearrange it,
b = wr − β
1− β
∫ ∞
0
(w − wr)dF (w) (2.2)
In the context of a public program that guarantees some employment or
cash-on-hand, the utility (in terms of income) that one can get from opting out
of private sector increases if one participates in NREGA program. Note also
that the RHS of equation 2.2 is a monotonically increasing function of wr. As a
result, Participating in NREGA increases reservation wage.
While looking at spousal response to partners’ participation in public works
program, we need to assume a unitary household model and intra-household
sharing mechanism — the benefit from NREGA program may transmit from
participants to non-participant members in the same household. Compared
to individuals from non-participating households, these non-participants from
treated households have better fallback options, hence more likely to have a
higher bargaining power in negotiating wages with landlords in private labor
markets.
2.5 Data
Our sample includes 471 villages in 5 districts in Andhra Pradesh, i.e. Visakha-
patnam, Nellore, Kadapa, Warangal and Nalgonda. Our data comes from three
sources. First, Rural Poverty Reduction Project survey data in 2004, 2006 and
2008 agricultural year; second, NREGA administrative data from the official
website; third, Indian population census data.
The survey data contain NREGA job card Identification Number and de-
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tailed information of household members’ labor market participation (other
than in NREGA programs), such as demographic backgrounds and salary or
wage in each work by season. 2004 survey was the first wave survey data,
mostly conducted during March-August 2004. The interview asks the subject
to recall information during June 2003-May 2004. Then, 2006 survey was con-
ducted intensively during August and October 2006; subjects were asked to
recall information during June 2005-May 2006. Similarly, 2008 survey was con-
ducted during September-December 2008, and subjects recalled information be-
tween June 2007-May 2008. Our survey data almost two waves of survey data
prior to the introduction of the program, and one wave after.
The administrative data (muster rolls) is downloaded from nregs official
website. It contains information on job card identification number, NREGA par-
ticipation for each participant, such as the start and end date of working at a
specific project in NREGA program, and total payment during each recorded
working period. Because our survey data is at person-season level, we need to
aggregate NREGA participation information into season level as well.
Population census data contain village information such as rainfall and other
village characteristics.
Since both survey and administrative data has job card information and
individual names, we use these to merge survey households and NREGA-
participating households from administrative data. The final data is in the form
of household-member-season. For each member in the household, we have la-
bor market participation information in each season.
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2.5.1 Program roll out and take-up
Table 2.1 documents how NREGA program rolled out in our sampling villages
and the variation of program take-up. Our survey divides the year into three
agricultural seasons based on rainfall amount, i.e. Karif season =June-October,
Rabi season = November-Feb, Summer season=March-May.
The start of NREGA program in a village is defined by the first day that
any household starts to work in this public program. In other words, suppose
NREGA program is already available in a village and households can apply for
it, but none of them really do, hence no NREGA work is going on in the village,
then this village is still viewed as a non-NREGA village. In this way, we find
the rolling out process of this program at village level. Our sample contains 471
villages in 5 districts. Table 2.1 shows at the end of the survey window, only 45
villages still didn’t have access to NREGA.
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Table 2.1: Program phased roll-out at village and individual level
Survey year season Villages Individuals
Starting
NREGA
With
NREGA
Without
NREGA
# of
non-
part.
# of
partic-
ipants
participation
rate
2006 Kharif 0 0 471 8509
2006 Rabi 2 2 469 8494 0
2006 Summer 219 221 250 8342 68 1.90%
2007 75 296 175
2008 Kharif 42 338 133 8156 779 12.50%
2008 Rabi 11 349 122 8254 664 9.81%
2008 Summer 77 426 45 7663 1,165 15.97%
post survey 45
total # of villages 471
Table 2.1 also suggests NREGA takes a long time to take off, when we com-
pare village roll out and households take up rate. Although half of the villages
already had access to NREGA in May 2006 (phase 1), only 2% individuals ac-
tually worked in it. Phase 2 districts started in April 2007. Our data does not
cover this period. Starting in June 2007, take up rate increased to around 12.5%
in our sampling villages.
We exploit the fact that this program was taken up gradually at individually
level, treating three seasons in 2006 survey year as pre-treatment periods, and
the corresponding seasons in 2008 as post periods.
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Figure 2.2: Grouping of the sample
2.5.2 Descriptives
Table 2.2 presents a comparison for three groups of individuals based on their
own participation status in NREGA program and their spouses’ participation
status. Karif season and Rabi season are aggregated as agricultural main sea-
son. First I divide all households in the sample into three types depending on
couples’ participation status in NREGA program, see Figure 2.2. Type 1 house-
holds, or “one-participant households”, have either wife or husband partici-
pate in NREGA program; Type 2 households, or “no-participant households”,
have neither of the spouse participate in NREGA; Type 3 households, or “two-
participant households”, have both of the spouse participate in it. Second, I fur-
ther divide individual workers from “partially-participating households” into
two groups – participants and non-participants, as shown in block 1 and block
2 in Table 2.2.
We will estimate the spillover effect of participating NREGA by comparing
non-participating spouse from partially-participating households and workers
from non-participating households. The last two blocks in Table 2.2 presents
the comparison for these two groups. Panel 2 presents average number of days
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an individual works if he/she does that type of work. Panel 3 is informative
in terms of potential wage effect. For instance, in agricultural season, a female
non-participant from treated households on average earns 48.7 Rupees/day, as
opposed to 48 Rupees/day for a female worker from control households. In
addition, the former works on average 57.7 days as agricultural wage labor, as
opposed to 58.4 days in the latter group. The fact that non-participating spouses
from treated households receive a higher wage and work fewer days than indi-
viduals from control households is consistent with our empirical results.
The first block about participants from partially-participating households in
Table 2.2 answers the following questions. First, it shows how many days and
how much do they earn in each season. Females participate in NREGA for more
days than males, have equal daily payment, and on average earning more than
males. Such results are consistent with the initial goal of empowering women.
Second, it answers what else these participants do other than NREGA works.
Quite surprisingly, Panel 2 shows that they work for no fewer days than peo-
ple not participating in NREGA, consistent with an earlier finding of unmet
demand of nregs works. Panel 3 shows their wages in private sector are a bit
higher than non-participants.
According to National Sample Surveys (NSS), in 2006-07, the average
monthly per capita expenditure (MPCE) for rural households is 695 Rupees or
about $14. About 52 percent of this MPCE was spent on food4. NSSO survey on
situation assessment of farmers (2003) estimate that a farmer household, on the
average, has a total monthly income of 2115 Rupees from all sources (Bahala,
2008).
4http://www.prb.org/Publications/Articles/2008/howindianslive.aspx
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2.6 Empirical Model and Identification
In a village with NREGA program, some households apply for and finally get
work opportunities from this program, whereas other households may either
not apply or finally do not pass final review process. We define the first type of
households “participating households” where either husband or wife (but not
both) participates in NREGA program, and the second type “non-participating
households” if neither husband nor wife participates in the program. We have
dropped households where both husband and wife work in NREGA program,
because in those families it is unclear whether individual i’s wage change is
a reaction to its own participation to the program or a reaction to its spouse’s
participation.
NREGA gradually rolls out to 426 out of 471 villages in our sample areas
during 2006-2008. To estimate ATT on wages, theoretically there are two differ-
ent comparisons we could make. One is comparing participating households in
NREGA-available villages to households in NREGA-non-available villages, and
the other is comparing participating households to non-participating house-
holds in NREGA-available villages. While the former comparison is the con-
ventional way of estimating ATT, instrumental variable methodology needs the
assumption that the rolling out process needs to be random across villages. Al-
ternatively, the variation of participation status in the second comparison purely
comes from individual self selection, which poses a threat to identify the wage
effect. Considering the fact that random assignment of NREGA at village level
seems too strong an assumption, we use the second comparison and try to iden-
tify ATT by mitigating the concerns due to self-selection. Because even non-
participants are also faced with the “option value” of the availability of the pro-
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gram, this comparison will yield an underestimated wage effect.
The identification strategy for ATT is based on the assumption that the dis-
tribution of NREGA job opportunities is exogenous to households, so that with-
out NREGA job, individual wage growths in Treatment and Control households
would have identical trends. However, if some households (e.g. elite class)
have manipulation power on the distribution of job opportunities, then this
assumption will be violated. For instance, if households with high-skill non-
participants are more likely to obtain NREGA work opportunities, then the ef-
fect of receiving public works on non-participants’ private sector wages will be
confounded by non-participants’ skill/ability.
Fortunately, with seasonal data in our sample, we can use the model in the
well cited job displacement study by Jacobson et al. (1993) to identify self
response and spousal response of labor market outcomes to participating in
NREGA for the participating households. It’s essentially a dif-in-dif framework
but allows to simultaneously estimate all pre-treatment trends of outcomes in
addition to main treatment effect in current periods. If participants and nonpar-
ticipants present similar wage growth path prior to the introduction of NREGA,
then our estimation is less likely to be driven by self-selection.
Empirical specifications for self-response analysis are as follows. In estimat-
ing individual response to its own participation in the program, we define the
treatment indicator Dit as follows: Dit = 1 if individual i works in NREGA pro-
gram at time t, and otherwise Dit = 0. I estimate the same model separately
for wives and husbands. In the parallel analysis of spousal response to the part-
ner’s participation, treatment indicator is defined in the same way, but left hand
side variables in the regression model are the spouse’s outcomes rather than in-
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dividual i’s own outcomes.
We have two years of data, 2006 and 2008, each with three seasons. In 2006,
no one gets treated. In 2008, participants move in and out of NREGA program
during the three seasons. Therefore, we could compare labor market outcomes
for participants and non-participants in each season in 2008, using three seasons
in 2006 as three pre-treatment trends. For instance, to estimate the treatment
effect for Karif season in 2008 (p = Karif season, 2008), I extract the sample that
appear in Karif season of 2008 and also in the three seasons of 2006. Then I
estimate the following model:
ypit =
( ∑
k=−2,−1,0
γpkD
k
it
)
+ αpi + λ
p
t + β
pXit + ε
p
it (2.3)
where t indicates time, one of the seasons in 2006 and the treatment time in
2008. αpi captures individual fixed effect; λ
s
t captures seasonal time trends. Xit
includes age squares and reading ability for individual i and its spouse, caste
and dependency ratio interacted with time. In the self-response analysis, ypit is
individual i′s own wage and workdays in the private agricultural labor market;
Dkit = 1 for NREGA participant i′s kth season from the current treatment time
p (and in this example p = Karif season, 2008). Note that the three seasons in
2006 serve as pre-treatment periods. k = −2 stands for Rabi season in 2006, the
second to last season before the 2008 Karif season. k = −1 stands for Summer
season in 2006, the last season before the current treatment season. The first
season in 2006, Karif season, is used as the baseline and omitted in the regres-
sion. k = 0 stands for the current season, and in this example Karif season in
2008. Therefore, γp0 gives the estimate for the effect of participating in NREGA;
γp−1 and γ
p
−2 give the estimates for pre-treatment effects and provide the test for
common pre-trend assumption. If estimates for γ−2 and γ−1 are close to zero,
72
then it supports the common pre-trend assumption.
Similarly, we could estimate the treatment effect for participants who work
in NREGA in Rabi or Summer season in 2008 using the same model. However,
the drawback of doing these three estimations separately by season is that it is
hard to get statistical significance, because of the low take-up rate in the pro-
gram. Therefore, we append these three samples together, and estimate Equa-
tion 2.4. Because both Karif and Rabi seasons are agricultural main seasons with
substantial agricultural labor demand, we further assume the treatment effects
for these two seasons are homogeneous. Eventually, the seasonal heterogeneous
effect is split into agricultural main and off season. All results given in the paper
are based on this combined model5:
yit =
( ∑
k=−2,−1
γkD
k
it
)
+ γmD
m
it + γlD
l
it + αi + λt + βXit + εit (2.4)
where γm and γl provide the estimated effects for agricultural main season and
lean season, respectively.
2.7 Results
For all the results reported below, it seems that statistical significance is not
quite high. This is because of the small number of treated individuals. Having
dropped families where both spouses participate in NREGA, the final sample
contains on average 90 men or 150 women participants in each season. The
following sections present individual own response and spousal response, and
then a pattern of these effects.
5We find similar results when estimating treatment effects for each season separately follow-
ing Equation 2.3.
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2.7.1 When husbands work in NREGA
Table 2.3 presents men’s own response to participating in NREGA, and Table 2.4
presents wives’ labor market response to husbands’ participation. Agricultural
labor only happens in private market, whereas casual labor includes both agri-
cultural labor and non-ag labor (note that NREGA work mostly is recorded as
non-ag casual labor). In each work type, the outcome variables are wage, inten-
sive margin of labor supply (i.e. how many days worked) and extensive margin
of labor supply (i.e. whether or not working) Essentially, we would like to see
when a husband participates in NREGA, whether he works more or less in pri-
vate labor market and how his private market wage changes. We also want to
see how his wife, who does not work in this NREGA but only participates in
private market, changes her labor market performance.
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Table 2.3: Men’s Self Response, using NREGA payment 300 Rupees as cut off
Casual labor Ag casual labor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Wage Days Work Y/N Wage Days Work Y/N
Treatment * Rabi season, 2006 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.00 -1.29 -0.00
(0.01) (1.79) (0.01) (0.01) (1.66) (0.01)
Treatment * Summer season, 2006 0.01 2.97 -0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (2.29) (0.02) (0.01) (2.28) (0.02)
Treatment * Main season 0.02 3.63 0.05 0.07* -5.20 0.02
(0.04) (4.83) (0.04) (0.04) (4.66) (0.05)
Treatment * Off season 0.01 4.17 0.09 0.00 2.83 0.01
(0.04) (4.37) (0.06) (0.05) (4.70) (0.06)
Observations 14790 14790 29532 12275 12275 29532
R2 0.816 0.715 0.725 0.810 0.706 0.697
All models include a full set of individual and season fixed effect, and observable covari-
ates. Standard errors are clustered at household level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 2.4: Spousal response, wife to husband, NREGA payment 300 Rupees above
Casual labor Ag casual labor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Wage Days Work Y/N Wage Days Work Y/N
Treatment * Rabi season, 2006 -0.01 -1.48 -0.02 -0.01 -1.54 -0.01
(0.01) (1.75) (0.01) (0.01) (1.77) (0.01)
Treatment * Summer season, 2006 0.01 3.57 -0.02 0.02 3.20 -0.01
(0.01) (2.72) (0.03) (0.01) (2.83) (0.03)
Treatment * Main season 0.05 -5.97 -0.07* 0.06* -6.86 -0.10**
(0.04) (4.97) (0.04) (0.03) (4.69) (0.05)
Treatment * Off season 0.02 4.68 0.02 0.04 0.56 0.02
(0.04) (3.99) (0.05) (0.04) (4.28) (0.06)
Observations 16731 16731 29532 15911 15911 29532
R2 0.780 0.664 0.713 0.791 0.676 0.694
Notes: Casual labor includes both ag and nonagricultural casual labor who earns daily
wage. Column 1, 2 and 4, 5 restrict the sample to individuals who work a positive num-
ber of days as agricultural wage labor, whereas column 3 and 6 also include individuals
who don’t work as agricultural wage labor. All models include a full set of individual and
season fixed effect, and observable covariates. Standard errors are clustered at household
level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
The first thing we observe from Table 2.3 and Table 2.4 is pre-treatment effect.
Table 2.3 shows wage paths of participant husbands do not differ from that of
non-participant husbands in terms of statistical significance and economic mag-
nitude. Similarly, Table 2.3 tells wage paths of wives whose husbands partici-
pate in NREGA are not statistically different from wage paths of wives whose
husbands do not participate in NREGA.
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Second, look at wage effect and employment effect. Table 2.3 shows that par-
ticipant men gain 7% wage increase in agricultural labor market, in agricultural
main season. This effect probably indicates that the introduction of NREGA has
led to competition for labor between private sector and public works.
Third, corresponding to a positive wage effect for participant husbands, Ta-
ble 2.4 shows, if husbands work in NREGA, their wives tend to gain 6 percent
increase and work 6 days less in agricultural labor market, compared to women
whose husbands do not work in NREGA. This is consistent with our story of
wage bargaining and unitary household model.
2.7.2 When wives work in NREGA
Different from men’s effect, women’s effect concentrates in agricultural off sea-
son. Table 2.5 shows women’s participation as casual wage labor in private sec-
tor has increased in lean season. This result indicates that NREGA has helped to
generate more employment for women, especially in agricultural off season. At
the same time, results also suggest a crowding out effect for female workers in
off season. Participant women work for 5 fewer days and earn 8 percent higher
wage as agricultural daily worker, compared to non-participant women.
The finding that treatment effects only appears in off season is also consistent
with that in Imbert and Papp (2015), although they do not distinguish men and
women. As they argue, NREGA work is mainly going on in off season. This
reason may also apply in our data, as Figure 2.1 shows more work is going on
in Summer season. More interestingly, seasonality is not simply due to variation
in demand, but might also reflect elite pressure. For instance, as Anderson et al.
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(2015) argue, landlords might seek to control governance in order to suppress
wage pressure.
Table 2.5: Women’s Self Response, using NREGA payment 300 Rupees as cut off
Casual labor Ag casual labor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Wage Days Work Y/N Wage Days Work Y/N
Treatment * Rabi season, 2006 0.00 -0.86 0.01 0.01 -0.97 0.01
(0.01) (1.26) (0.01) (0.01) (1.19) (0.01)
Treatment * Summer season, 2006 0.01 -5.97*** -0.03 0.00 -6.67*** -0.04*
(0.01) (2.14) (0.02) (0.01) (2.17) (0.02)
Treatment * Main season 0.04* 3.50 -0.04 0.03 2.24 -0.05
(0.02) (2.94) (0.03) (0.02) (2.84) (0.03)
Treatment * Off season 0.08*** 4.94* 0.04 0.08*** -5.45* 0.01
(0.02) (2.91) (0.03) (0.03) (3.16) (0.04)
Observations 16731 16731 29532 15911 15911 29532
R2 0.780 0.665 0.713 0.792 0.677 0.694
Note: Casual labor includes both ag and nonagricultural casual labor who earns daily wage.
Column 1, 2 and 4, 5 restrict the sample to individuals who work a positive number of days
as agricultural wage labor, whereas column 3 and 6 also include individuals who don’t work
as agricultural wage labor.
All models include a full set of individual and season fixed effect, and observable covariates.
Standard errors are clustered at household level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Table 2.6 estimate husbands’ response to wives’ participation in NREGA.
Unlike wives’ response to husbands, when wives work in NREGA, husbands do
not show any statistically significant reaction in either agricultural labor market
or casual labor market as a whole. Only in column (5), the effect on intensive
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working days is close to being statistically significant with t-statistics being 1.4.
This means husbands whose wives work in NREGA tend to work for 6 days
less than husbands whose wives don’t work in NREGA.
Table 2.6: spousal response, Husband to wife, NREGA payment 300 Rupees above
Casual labor Ag casual labor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Wage Days Work Y/N Wage Days Work Y/N
Treatment * Rabi season, 2006 0.00 -0.37 0.01 -0.01 -1.42 0.00
(0.01) (1.41) (0.01) (0.01) (1.47) (0.01)
Treatment * Summer season, 2006 0.01 -2.45 0.01 0.00 -3.75* 0.02
(0.01) (1.98) (0.02) (0.01) (2.14) (0.02)
Treatment * Main season -0.01 -4.54 0.00 0.02 -3.19 0.02
(0.04) (3.61) (0.03) (0.03) (4.23) (0.04)
Treatment * Off season -0.03 -0.92 -0.01 -0.03 -6.01 -0.03
(0.04) (3.44) (0.04) (0.04) (4.16) (0.04)
Observations 14790 14790 29532 12275 12275 29532
R2 0.816 0.715 0.725 0.809 0.706 0.697
All models include a full set of individual and season fixed effect, and observable covari-
ates. Standard errors are clustered at household level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
2.7.3 Pattern of treatment effects
We test if our earlier estimates rely on the definition of treated households. In
the context of wage bargaining story, a tiny amount of monetary benefit from
the program may not be helpful enough to raise reservation wage. In the main
results given above, as long as husband/wife participates in the program and
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receives more than 300 Rupees, then their households are counted as treated
households. In robustness checks, I redefine treated households as, having the
spouse work in the program and receive money greater than a certain amount
of Rupees. I tried several thresholds, i.e. 100, 200, ..., 800.
An interesting pattern is, as husbands or wives work more days and receive
more payment from NREGA work, the according effects are getting stronger.
This probably indicates the role of income effect underlying wage and employ-
ment response.
2.8 Conclusion and Discussion
This paper uses a difference-in-differences method to estimate labor market ef-
fects of public works schemes for the participating households, in the context of
NREGA. We find a positive wage effect (and a negative labor supply effect) for
the participants of public work schemes and for their spouses. The results are
consistent with a unitary household utility model and wage bargaining story.
First, when either husbands or wives work in NREGA, their own wages at
agricultural labor market tend to increase by 7 percent and work for 6 days less,
although we are not clear why wives’ own response mainly occurs in agricul-
tural off season, while men’s wage effect is in main season. Second, combin-
ing results of self response and spousal response, we find an interesting phe-
nomenon — own and spousal response go side by side. In main season, when
participating men gain 7% positive wage effect, hence a possible income effect,
their wives who are not working in public works programs reduce labor sup-
ply by about 6-10 agricultural working days, and gain 6% higher agricultural
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daily wage. Similarly, in the lean season, when participating women gain 8%
wage increase, their husbands usually work 6 days less than non-participant
women’s husbands, although not statistically significant. This result is consis-
tent with a unitary household utility model and wage bargaining story. Intu-
itively, when husbands (wives) participate in public works program, the benefit
obtained from this program may transmit to their wives (husbands) as well,
hence leading to a higher reservation wage for the latter.
The findings are further supported by the heterogeneous effects by season
and by participation intensity. Men’s own wage effect and spousal wage effect
only exist in agricultural main season, while women’s in agricultural off season.
This suggests NREGA works may bring competition for labor in agricultural
main season. Another pattern is as husbands work more days and receive more
payment from NREGA work, wives’ labor supply show a stronger negative ef-
fect. This pattern may indicate an income sharing mechanism underlying these
wage effects.
The identification of our estimates relies on the assumption that, condi-
tional on observables included in our model, the distribution of NREGA job
opportunities is exogenous to households. In other words, without NREGA
employment, individual wage growths in treatment and control households
would have identical trends. By using the multiple-period dif-in-dif method-
ology used in JLS’s job displacement analysis, we try to show that the estimated
wage effects are not driven by unobserved pre-treatment trends because the
pre-treatment effects are all close to zero.
This identification strategy is, however, prone to the following two main cri-
tiques. First, which households are treated? If households self-select into the
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programs, for instance, if poorer people are more likely to work in the pro-
gram and if they have different wage and employment paths from richer peo-
ple, then the common trend assumption underlying dif-in-dif model will be vio-
lated. Second, within each treated household, how do the husband and the wife
decide which person goes to work in NREGA? If they make joint decisions, e.g.
husbands work in NREGA just because their wives are competitive in private
labor market, then the positive correlation between husbands’ participation in
NREGA and wives’ private sector wages will be spurious. In addition, the es-
timation only exploits the sample of “partially-participating households” and
“not-participating households”, and drops households that have both spouses
participate in NREGA.
The first concern could be partly addressed by several facts on job alloca-
tions of NREGA. First, during the study period, low take-up rate (around 10%)
eases the concern on households’ self-selection into the program. Only a small
fraction of lucky households participates in NREGA in the first two years, be-
cause workers are unaware of their entitlement to employment. This situation
improves only when local volunteer organizations help them to learn to apply
for a job card, demand work and open a bank account, tracking the payment of
their wages and filing complaints. For instance, in Jharkhand state, local vol-
unteers operate the program NREGA Sahayata Kendras to help workers secure
work entitlements. Even after rural workers are fully aware of this job oppor-
tunity, there is still a considerable un-met demand in all states due to supply
constraints (e.g. Dutta et al., 2012; Sukhtankar, 2016). Second, the accuracy of
targeting is in general insufficient, as large numbers of needy households are in
the queue for job cards (Jha et al., 2008). This means that not only rural poor but
rural non-poor also participate in NREGA, although participation rates among
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the poor are indeed higher (Dutta et al., 2012). Inefficient targeting and sup-
ply constraint to some extent mitigate the concern on households’ self-selection
into the program by poverty status or individual capability of finding a job in
private sector.
Furthermore, I will conduct two sets of empirical analysis to address these
two concerns. The first analysis provides an evaluation of the magnitude and
direction of household self-selection. As indicated in Figure 2.2, there are four
types of households. Type 1 households have only husbands participate in
NREGA program; Type 2 households have only wives participate in NREGA
program; Type 3 households, “no-participant households”, have neither of the
spouses participate in NREGA; Type 4 households, “two-participant house-
holds”, have both of the spouses participate in it. For each type of households, I
create a binary indicatorDmh , which equals to 1 if the household h belong to Type
m(m = 1, 2, 3, 4) and 0 otherwise. Then I examine the likelihood of households
self selecting into the program by estimating the following equation:
Dmht = β
mXht + λ
m
t + ε
m
ht (2.5)
where t indicates one of the six seasons in 2006 and 2008; Xht is a vector of
household characteristics, including caste, household poverty type, religion,
age of the household head, reading and writing ability of the household head,
household dependency ratio. λt controls for seasonal fixed effect. I do not in-
clude household fixed effects, because otherwise time invariant covariates will
all drop from the regressions.
The sign and significance level of βm will provide an estimate for household
level self-selection into Type m households. For example, β1 will suggest what
kind of households have only husbands participate in NREGA, and their rela-
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tive household characteristics compared to other types of households. Estimates
of βm close to zero would provide that Type m households are not significantly
different from other types of households, and therefore eliminating the concern
on self-selection. On the other hand, if βm is different from zero both econom-
ically and statistically, then the estimation of wage effects needs to adjust for
this probability. One way of adjusting this probability is simply including the
estimated probability from Equation 2.5 into the right hand side of the origi-
nal model 2.3. The other way is explicitly modeling households’ self-selection
into NREGA, and modeling the joint decision making within the household by
allowing correlated error terms6.
The second analysis provides an alternative way of estimating labor market
effects of participating NREGA. The original model in the paper has only one
treatment variable, either individual own participation in NREGA or the part-
ner’s participation, in the right hand side of the equation. Such a model will
yield biased estimates for the treatment effect if the spouses make a joint deci-
sion on who works in NREGA. Equation 2.9 mitigates this concern by including
three treatment variables to the right hand side of the model; that is, an indicator
for individual own participation in NREGA (Dit), an indicator for the partner’s
6The following few lines provide an initial setup of the model.
Let Djit be an indicator for participating NREGA, where j indicates the husband or wife.
Djit = 1[z
j
itγ
j + µj + jit] for j ∈ {H,W} (2.6)
Then individual i makes decision on labor supply in the private labor market. i′s employment
outcome is determined by the following two latent variables:
V Eit = x
E
itβE + η
E
i + θ
E
it (2.7)
V NEit = x
NE
it βNE + η
NE
i + θ
NE
it (2.8)
Individual i′s employment outcome is determined by L∗it = maxl{V lit}forl ∈ {E,NE}
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participation (DSit) and the interaction term of these two (DitDSit).
yit = β0Dit + δ0D
S
it + θ0DitD
S
it + αi + λt + γ1Xit + γ2Xht + εit (2.9)
where Dit = 1 if individual i works in NREGA and 0 otherwise; DSit = 1 if
individual i′s spouse works in NREGA and 0 otherwise; yit is individual i′s la-
bor market outcomes including wage and workdays in the private agricultural
market. Xit and Xht are respectively individual and household demographic
information. This model will give estimates for individual own response to
participation in NREGA and spousal response to the partner’s participation in
NREGA at the same time. In particular, when restricting the sample to wives,
the model will provide estimates for how wives’ private labor market outcomes
are affected by their own participation in NREGA (β0) and by husbands’ par-
ticipation in NREGA (δ0). Likewise, when restricting the sample to husbands,
the model will provide husbands’ response to their own and wives’ participa-
tion in NREGA. Moreover, this model also provides the estimated effect of both
spouses working in NREGA on individual private labor market outcomes.
A disadvantage of Equation 2.9 to the original model is that this model does
not estimate pre-treatment trends. Therefore, an improvement to this model is,
as before, using three seasons in 2006 as pre-treatment periods and estimate the
following model:
ypit =
( ∑
k=−2,−1,0
βpkD
k
it
)
+
( ∑
k=−2,−1,0
δpkD
Sk
it
)
+
( ∑
k=−2,−1,0
θpkD
k
itD
Sk
it
)
+ αpi + λ
p
t + γ
p
1X
p
it + γ
p
2X
p
ht + ε
p
it (2.10)
where k = −2 stands for Rabi season in 2006; k = −1 stands for Summer sea-
son in 2006; k = 0 stands for the current season. This model is essentially a
combination of Equation 2.9 and Equation 2.3. Dkit = 1 for NREGA participant
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i′s kth season from the treatment time p; DSkit = 1 for individual i′s kth season
from the treatment time p, if i′s spouse participates in NREGA in season p. βp0
gives the estimated effect of individual i′s participation in NREGA on own la-
bor market outcomes; δp0 gives the estimated effect of the spouse’s participation
in NREGA on individual i′s labor market outcomes; θp0 gives the estimated re-
sponse of individual i′s labor market outcomes to both spouses’ participation in
NREGA. The coefficients with subscripts−2 and−1 provide the according tests
for pre-treatment trends.
Furthermore, as in the estimation equation 2.4, we can also pool the three
treatment seasons in 2008 and estimate a general model. If we are not interested
in heterogeneous effects by seasons, then we can estimate the following model:
yit =
( ∑
k=−2,−1,0
βkD
k
it
)
+
( ∑
k=−2,−1,0
δkD
Sk
it
)
+
( ∑
k=−2,−1,0
θkD
k
itD
Sk
it
)
+ αi + λt + γ1Xit + γ2Xht + εit (2.11)
which will give the average effects of individual i and/or its spouse’s participa-
tion in NREGA on individual i′s labor market outcomes.
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CHAPTER 3
MINIMUM WAGE COMPETITION BETWEEN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
IN CHINA
Ravi Kanbur (Cornell University)
Yanan Li (Cornell University)
Carl Lin (Bucknell University)
3.1 Abstract
The theory of fiscal and regulatory competition between jurisdictions is more
advanced than its empirical testing. This is particularly true of labor regula-
tion in general, and minimum wage regulation in particular, and especially so
for developing countries. This paper utilizes the spatial lag methodology to
study city-level strategic interactions in setting and enforcing minimum wage
standards during 2004-2012 in China. We manually collect a panel data set of
city-level minimum wage standards from China’s government websites. This
analysis finds strong evidence of spatial interdependence in minimum wage
standards and enforcement among main cities in China. If other cities decrease
minimum wage standards by 1 RMB, the host city will decrease its standard by
about 0.7-3.2 RMB. If the violation rate in other cities increases by 1 percentage
point, the host city will respond by an increase of roughly 0.4-1.0 percentage
points. These interactions suggest the need for policy coordination in labor reg-
ulation in China.
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3.2 Introduction
Strategic interactions of fiscal policies among governments have been well dis-
cussed in both theoretical and empirical studies. Early examples of theory pa-
pers on tax competition include Kanbur and Keen (1993); Edwards and Keen
(1996); Wilson and Wildasin (2004).1 Compared to tax competition and environ-
mental policy competition, however, jurisdictional interactions of labor stan-
dards and regulatory policies have not been studied as intensively (some exam-
ples include Duanmu, 2014; Davies and Vadlamannati, 2013).
A conventional wisdom is that there is a potential “race to the bottom” in
labor standards across countries. Governments might undercut each other’s
labor standards to attract foreign capital (e.g. Chau and Kanbur, 2006; Davies
and Vadlamannati, 2013; Olney, 2013). On the other hand, strategic interactions
among jurisdictions could also lead to a “race to the top” of labor standards, for
example, in the case that labor becomes a scarce resource. Regardless it is race
to the bottom or to the top, the key idea is policies in one country might be influ-
enced by those in others. While the existing literature has provided evidence on
between-country interactions in labor standards, there is so far little evidence
on within-country competition, especially in developing countries. Given the
importance of this issue, this paper fills the gap by providing the evidence for
strategic interactions on minimum wage standards in China.
This paper focuses on minimum wages as a leading example of a labor stan-
dard for the following reasons. First, minimum wage standards directly reflect
1Examples of other papers on tax competition, environmental regulation competition and
welfare competition include: Allers and Elhorst (2005); Brueckner and Saavedra (2001); Ed-
mark and A˚gren (2008); Fredriksson and Millimet (2002); Konisky (2007); Markusen et al. (1995);
Plu¨mper et al. (2009).
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the strictness of local labor market and other labor standards. For instance, an
increase of minimum wages leads to a rightward shift of the whole wage dis-
tribution (Neumark et al., 2004). Second, the frequent adjustment of minimum
wage standards since 2004, coupled with large spatial variations of both mini-
mum wage standards and its enforcement, make China an ideal policy setting to
identify interjurisdictional competition within a country. Before the year 2004,
a minimum wage standard was close to nonexistent, with low statutory levels
and weak enforcement of the laws. From the mid-2000s onwards, however, ris-
ing concerns on inequality led to considerable strengthening of regulation and
enforcement. Third, minimum wages and its enforcement have a relatively de-
centralized decision-making system in China, which is also critical to the study
of jurisdictional competition. Therefore, we use minimum wages as an example
to study labor standard competition.
This paper relies on a Spatial Lag framework combined with exogenous co-
variates to identify the spatial interdependence in setting up and enforcing min-
imum wage standards in China. In the analysis of minimum wage standards,
we collect a panel data set of city-level minimum wage standards from China’s
government websites during 2004-2012. To estimate the magnitude of spatial
interdependence, we first estimate a spatial static panel data model using both
Maximum Likelihood method and Instrumental Variables (IV/GMM) method,
then estimate a dynamic panel data model using Arellano-Bond GMM estima-
tor. The analysis finds strong evidence of spatial correlation in minimum wage
standards. If other cities increase (or decrease) minimum wage standards by 1
RMB, the host city will increase (or decrease) its standard by about 0.7-3.2 RMB.
Then we conduct a parallel analysis of strategic interactions on minimum
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wage enforcement. The literature on fiscal competition has found that enforce-
ment policies are used as instruments for fiscal competition, when competition
in tax rates are banned (Cremer and Gahvari, 2000). For instance, Ronconi (2012)
finds that governments react to the competitive pressures produced by FDI in-
flow by turning a blind eye to noncompliance of labor laws. Bhorat et al. (2012) is
an example of a recent literature documenting non-compliance with minimum
wage regulation in developing countries. Despite data limitations, the current
paper makes the first attempt to assess competition on the enforcement of min-
imum wage standards. We find that if the violation rate in other cities increases
by 1 percentage point, the host city will respond by an increase of roughly 0.3
percentage points.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the insti-
tutional background of minimum wage setting in China. Section 3, data. Sec-
tion 4 sets the empirical model and discusses identification strategies. Section 5
presents the main results, followed by checks in Section 6. Section 7 concludes
by putting our results in the context of the broader literature and looks ahead to
areas for further research.
3.3 Institutional Background
3.3.1 Minimum wage setting and enforcement in China
Minimum wage regulations have been existing in China since the 1990s, but
only with low level of standards and weak enforcement. Things did not change
until the early 2000s, when rising income inequality became a national concern.
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In 2004, the Ministry of Labor and Social Security issued a “Minimum Wage
Regulations” law, stipulating that provinces should adjust minimum wage lev-
els at least every two years to fit local living standards. Then the next decade
saw frequent upward minimum wage adjustments along with improved com-
pliance. Table 1 shows that over 60 percent of cities adjust minimum wage
standards each year during 2004-2012 (except for 2009). While real minimum
wage rates almost doubled during 2004-2009, the average noncompliance rate
decreased from 10 to 7 percent (Table B.1 in the Appendix).
The decision process of minimum wage adjustment varies by province. In
some provinces, prefecture-cities are actively involved in adjusting minimum
wage standards.2 For instance, the city Chengdu in Sichuan province and the
city Shenzhen in Guangdong province could set their own minimum wage stan-
dards, according to our survey with local practitioners. In other provinces,
cities and counties are sorted into several tiers based on their economic devel-
opment levels (usually four). The provincial government then consults with
labor unions and sets the floors of minimum wage standards for each group of
cities. The wiggle room left for city governments in deciding the final minimum
wage standards is articulated in two ways: which group to be grouped into;
and whether (and of what magnitude) it is possible to further adjust upward
the standard given the floor. For instance, the city Haimen in Jiangsu province
was in tier 2 areas before 2007, but in tier 1 since 2008. Therefore, cities in such
provinces have some degree of flexibility in the final decision of minimum wage
standards. Overall, cities have some flexibility in setting up minimum wage
standards in most provinces, which is evidenced by large within province vari-
2China’s administrative structure includes, from high to low levels, provinces, prefecture-
level cities, and counties. A prefecture-level city comprises a central urban area and several
counties.
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ations of minimum wage standards.
When it comes to enforcing minimum wage laws, the “Minimum Wage Reg-
ulation” law specifies that county-above governments are in charge of the en-
forcement in local areas. Therefore, prefecture-level cities, which stand one level
above counties, will have full control over minimum wage enforcement in their
cities.
3.3.2 Motivation of local leaders to compete on minimum
wages
Leaders of city governments have at least the following three motivations to
compete each other on minimum wage standards and enforcement. While they
are all plausible and have been documented in the literature, this paper does
not discriminate one source from another.
The first incentive for interjurisdictional competition on minimum wages is
competing for capital, which would lead to a race to the bottom of minimum
wages. If we assume capital flows to places with lower labor cost, then more
stringent labor standards (e.g. minimum wages, labor rights) in local areas com-
pared to other areas would reduce the attractiveness of local environments for
firms. Therefore, local leaders might undercut each other’s labor standards and
employment protections to attract foreign (and domestic) capital (e.g. Chau and
Kanbur, 2006; Davies and Vadlamannati, 2013; Olney, 2013).
The second incentive for inter-jurisdictional competition on minimum wages
is competing for labor which, to the opposite of the first incentive, might lead to
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a race to the top of minimum wages. It has been argued that China has passed
the Lewis turning point and the era of surplus labor is over (Zhang et al., 2011).
Moreover, the last decade has seen rising labor costs across the country, be-
cause a tightening labor market in an era of high economic growth gives work-
ers stronger wage bargaining power. Therefore, city governments might engage
in the competition for labor.
Last but not least, city leaders might strategically set and enforce minimum
wage standards driven by promotion incentives. Promotion of local leaders in
China is decided by their upper-level governments, based on performance com-
parison across jurisdictions. It has been shown that such a promotion scheme
leads to tournament competition among local leaders in multiple aspects, such
as in investment (Yu et al., 2016) and coal mine safety (Shi and Xi, 2018). In a
similar vein, minimum wage standards have been used as an important tool
to curb the rising inequality; therefore, city leaders might be motivated to en-
gage in tournament competition in minimum wage standards to appeal to the
upper-level governments.
3.4 Data
We construct a panel data set from several sources. City level minimum wage
standards in 2004-2012 are manually collected from local government websites
(through searching “Baidu”, a Chinese version of Google).3 City characteristics
and boundary shapefiles are compiled from China Data Online (see Table B.1 in
3In the case that there are multiple levels of minimum wage standards within one prefecture-
level city, we use the highest one as that prefecture-level city’s minimum wage level. In (rare)
cases of two upward adjustments happening within one year (e.g. Hebei Province and Beijing
city in 2007), we take the second (and higher) one as that year’s minimum wage standard.
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the appendix for descriptive statistics of city characteristics).
The final data set for the analysis of minimum wage standards includes 252
prefecture-level cities in 25 provincial-level administrative units as opposed to
all 294 prefecture-level cities in 34 provincial-level units of China. This subsam-
ple property will not bias our estimations for the following three reasons. First,
the final data set is not derived by a non-random selection process, rather it is
a result of combining data sets from different sources.4 Second, results are not
driven by a particular province, as the estimates are not sensitive to dropping
any individual provinces (Section 6.1 will give more details). Third, we also
run two-sample t-tests for each economic variable in the omitted sample and
the included sample and find that none of the mean differences is statistically
significant.5
As discussed earlier, the frequent upward minimum wage adjustments pro-
vide a good source of identification for inter-jurisdictional dependence. Table
1 shows that about 58 percent of prefecture-level cities adjust minimum wages
in each year during 2004-2012. The only exception is 2009; no provinces ad-
justed minimum wages due to the financial crisis. 2006, 2010 and 2011 all saw a
two-digit increase of minimum wages compared to the previous years.
In the second main analysis, “race on minimum wage enforcement”, we
proxy the degree of enforcement by noncompliance rates of minimum wage
standards in the city, which is derived from 2002-09 Urban Household Survey
4China Data Online originally includes 286 cities. By combining it with minimum wage
data and generating a city-level data set, we lost 25 prefecture-level cities. Later, we lose 1
city when combining with the shapefile data set and drop 1 city because it is not present in
all years. As a result, we get seven “island” cities that have no neighboring cities. We drop
these “islands” when constructing the contiguity weighting matrix, and thereby losing 7 addi-
tional cities. Provincial-level units absent in the sample are Gansu, Qinghai, Xinjiang, Guizhou,
Hainan, Guizhou, Tibet, Hongkong and Macao.
5The results of t-test statistics for each economic variable is available upon request.
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(UHS hereafter). UHS is a continuous, large-scale social-economic survey con-
ducted by the National Bureau of Statistics of China to study the conditions
and living standards of urban households. Survey subjects include local ur-
ban households, non-local urban households who have lived in the city for at
least six months, and some rural-urban migrant households. The survey cov-
ers 16 representative provinces, but our sample only keeps the cities that were
surveyed throughout all years during 2004-2009. As a result, the final data
set in the analysis includes only 66 prefecture-level cities distributed in nine
provinces. Again, the relatively small sample size should not bias our estimates
of the spillover effect of minimum wage enforcement, given the randomness of
UHS sampling and sample selection process. As a matter of fact, the economic
characteristics are by and large quite similar between these 66 prefecture-level
cities and those dropped from the analysis.6
To calculate city specific noncompliance rates, we take advantage of the em-
ployment and wage information from the questionnaire.7 Specifically, we first
count the number of workers paid below local minimum wage standards, then
divide this number by the employment size in the city. As Table 3.1 shows, on
average, 9.2 percent of workers are underpaid during the study period. The
level of minimum wage standards is on average 38 percent of the median wage
in the city.
6The results of t-test statistics for each economic variable is available upon request.
7Individual monthly wage is derived by annual income/the number of months worked in
the year.
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Table 3.1: Trend of minimum wage standards, 2004-2012
Year
Min wage
(RMB)
Growth of min
wage (%)
%
of jurisdictions
adjusting min wage
Violation Rate
Kaitz ratio
(min wage/
median wage)
2004 366 9.3% 66% 8.9% 37%
2005 395 7.9% 35% 8.5% 35%
2006 459 16.2% 88% 9.0% 37%
2007 487 6.1% 62% 10.0% 40%
2008 509 4.4% 64% 9.8% 41%
2009 512 0.6% 0% 7.6% 38%
2010 616 20.4% 99%
2011 682 10.7% 78%
2012 745 9.2% 68%
Total 493 8.9% 58% 9.2% 38%
Note: Minimum wages are deflated by the provincial level CPI, using 2002 CPI as the base. City
level Violation rate is calculated as the fraction of workers paid below local minimum wages.
3.5 Empirical Specification
This paper uses the spatial lag framework to estimate city-level strategic interac-
tions in setting and enforcing minimum wage standards.8 For each analysis, we
first estimate a spatial static panel data model using both Maximum Likelihood
method9 and Instrumental Variables (IV/GMM) method, then we estimate a
8Other studies using the Spatial Lag framework include, for example, Brueckner and Saave-
dra (2001); Davies and Vadlamannati (2013); Edmark and A˚gren (2008); Konisky (2007); Olle´
(2003); Olney (2013); Plu¨mper et al. (2009); Shi and Xi (2018); Yu et al. (2016).
9A critique by Lyytika¨inen (2012) is that the cross-sectional maximum likelihood Spatial Lag
estimation and Spatial IV model overestimate the degree of interdependence in tax rates, as
compared to the policy change IV estimates. However, the author finds that the inclusion of
municipality fixed effects in the panel data model significantly reduces the bias (in the analysis
of general property tax). By this logic, as our model already takes advantage of panel data and
includes city fixed effects, we expect that any potential (upward) bias would become minimum.
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dynamic panel data model using Arellano-Bond GMM estimator.
3.5.1 Race on minimum wage standards
To test whether minimum wage standards in the host city depend on minimum
wage standards in other cities, we estimate the following Spatial Autoregression
Regression (SAR) model,
MWi,t = β0 + ρ
∑
j 6=i
ωj,iMWj,t + βXi,t−1 + ηi + σt + i,t (3.1)
where MWi,t is the minimum wage standard in city i in year t;
∑
j 6=i ωj,iMWj,t is
the Spatial Lag, the weighted average of minimum wage standards in other ju-
risdictional areas. Xi,t−1 is a vector of city-level economic characteristics, includ-
ing GDP, per capita GDP, industry share in total GDP, labor force participation
rate, the proportion of employees in primary industry, student enrollment in
secondary schools, student enrollment in primary schools, the number of large-
scale enterprises, the number of beds in hospitals.10 We take a 1-year lag of the
covariate vector to enhance the case for exogeneity.11 All values such as GDP
and minimum wages are deflated by the provincial level Consumer Price In-
dex, with 2002 as the base year. ηi controls for city fixed effects; σt controls for
year fixed effects. ρ captures the spatial dependence of minimum wages. For
descriptive statistics, see Table B.1 in the Appendix.
The key independent variable, spatial lag, is constructed using two differ-
ent weighting matrices ωj,i in the main results, and four additional weighting
10Industry share in total GDP = Secondary industry GDP/ total GDP. Labor force partici-
pation = the number of employees / population. The student enrollment in secondary and
primary schools and the number of hospital beds are all standardized by population.
11Our results remain when using 2-year or 3-year lags, but for the sake of sample size we use
1-year lag.
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matrices in the robustness checks. First, we use a contiguity matrix, where a
city’s neighbors are defined as prefecture cities that share borders with it. The
weighting matrix is normalized so that the row sum equals to unity. If the host
city i has ni neighbors, then weights are defined as,
ωj,i =

1/ni, if city j is one of the ni neighbors of city i’s
0, otherwise
(W1)
Second, we use an inverse distance-based weighting matrix, assuming that
closer cities have stronger impacts on city i than cities farther away. The
neighborhood-inverse distance matrix is as follows:
ωj,i = 1/dij,where dij is the distance between the centroids of city i and city j
(W2)
The main econometric challenge to identify the magnitude of the spatial in-
terdependence is the reflection problem (Manski, 1993). Because MWi,t and
MWj 6=i,t are simultaneously determined, the spatial lag term is not orthogonal to
the error term. As a result, OLS does not give consistent estimates. To deal with
this endogeneity, we use both Maximum Likelihood method and Instrumental
Variables (IV/GMM) method to derive the estimates (Brueckner, 2003). For ex-
ample, Davies and Vadlamannati (2013) use IV/GMM estimation method; Shi
and Xi (2018) use MLE method. We follow the traditional spatial IV method to
instrument the spatial lag with
∑
j 6=i ωj,iMWj,t, the weighted average of other
cities’ exogeneous variables. The identification assumption is that city j′s ex-
ogeneous variables only affect its own minimum wage standards but do not
directly impact those in city i.
In addition to estimating a static spatial lag model in Equation (3.1), we add
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time-lagged minimum wage standards into the right-hand side of the model,
because minimum wage standards in the current year might also depend on
minimum wages in the previous year. By doing so, the model becomes a dy-
namic panel model and fixed effect estimators are no longer consistent. To ad-
dress this issue and potential endogeneity concerns, we follow Olney (2013)
and estimate the dynamic model using Arellano–Bond GMM estimator (Arel-
lano and Bond, 1991). This method takes the first difference of the model and
instruments the right-hand side differenced terms with all their lagged levels.12
We also include additional instruments, the lagged levels of weighted averages
of other cities’ exogenous variables,
∑
j 6=i ωj,iMWj,t, which were used as instru-
ments in estimating Equation (3.1). The estimation equation is as follows:
∆MWi,t = αMWi,t−1 + ρ∆
∑
j 6=i
ωj,iMWj,t + β∆Xi,t−1 + ∆δt + ∆i,t (3.2)
where ∆MWi,t is the change of minimum wage standards in city i from year t-1
to year t;
∑
j 6=i ωj,iMWj,t is the change of the spatially lagged minimum wage
standards in city i from year t − 1 to year t. This method identifies a causal
impact of other cities’ minimum wage policies on the host city’s policy.
3.5.2 Race on minimum wage enforcement
To study jurisdictional interactions on enforcement, we modify the estimation
equation (3.1) by changing MWi,t to Ei,t, where Ei,t is the enforcement level in
12The estimation results are robust to using fewer lagged levels as instruments, and robust
to using the Blundell and Bond (1998) SYS-GMM method instead of difference GMM. The cen-
tral idea of the instruments is that, yi,t−2 is orthogonal to the differenced error term ∆it; or
E(yi,t−2∆it) = 0. Stata command is xtabond2 (Roodman, 2006).
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city i year t. The model is as follows,
Ei,t = β0 + ρ
∑
j 6=i
ωj,iEj,t + βXi,t−1 + γKaitzi,t + ηi + σt + i,t (3.3)
where Kaitzi,t indicates the ratio of minimum wage to median wage calculated
for each city. This is the only additional covariate compared to Equation (3.1);
we add it because cities with higher minimum wage standards tend to have
lower enforcement and higher violations. Enforcement intensity could ideally
be measured by the amount of resources (e.g. inspectors) that local govern-
ment invests to regulate minimum wage laws, but such data is lacking. As
stronger enforcement intensity is associated with lower minimum wage non-
compliance (Bhorat et al., 2012), we proxy enforcement by the headcount ratio
of minimum wage violations: the number of workers receiving below mini-
mum wages divided by the total number of working population. Again, Equa-
tion (3.3) is estimated using MLE and IV method, using the same instruments
as when estimating Equation (3.1).
Because the enforcement analysis uses household survey data to compute
violation rates, and the household survey is conducted in a randomly selected
subsample of cities in the country, we end up having many “islands” and other
cities with few contiguous neighbors. Therefore, we only use the inverse dis-
tance weighting matrix to construct spatial lags. The construction of the matrix
is the same as Formula (W2).
Again, we introduce a time-lagged enforcement variable into the righthand
side of Equation (3.3) and estimate the dynamic panel model using Arellano-
Bond method. The first differenced model is as follows,
∆Ei,t = αEi,t−1 + ρ∆
∑
j 6=i
ωj,iEj,t + β∆Xi,t−1 + ∆δt + ∆i,t (3.4)
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where ∆Ei,t is the change of minimum wage violation rates in city i. This model
identifies a causal impact of other cities’ enforcement levels on the host city’s
enforcement.
3.6 Main Results
3.6.1 Race on minimum wage standards
Table 3.2 presents estimation results for jurisdictional interdependence on mini-
mum wage standards using three different estimation methods and two weight-
ing matrices. Model 1-2 both use MLE method, with model 1 using the conti-
guity matrix (Formula W1) and model 2 using the inverse distance matrix (For-
mula W2). Likewise, Model 3-4 show IV/GMM estimation results; Model 5-6
use Arellano-Bond difference GMM estimation method, using all lagged terms
as instruments in addition to weighted averages of other cities’ economic char-
acteristics. Overall, these models give consistent results that other cities’ min-
imum wage standards have a positive effect on the host city’s minimum wage
standards. The magnitude of spatial dependence ranges between 0.7 and 3.2.
In words, if other areas increase their minimum wage by 1 RMB, the host city
will increase its minimum wage by 0.7-3.2 RMB. This magnitude is compara-
ble to that by other studies using similar methods. For instance, Davies and
Vadlamannati (2013) use the IV/GMM method to estimate spatial interaction in
labor standards across countries and find point estimates between 0.2 and 2. Ol-
ney (2013) finds the point estimate of intergovernmental dependence in em-
ployment protection is between 0.18 and 0.44 when using Arellano-Bond GMM
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method, but as large as between 1.6 and 2.9 when using the IV method.
Across the models, a few control variables have statistically significant point
estimates. First, cities with higher labor force participation will have higher
minimum wages. Second, higher enrollment rate of primary school students
is associated with higher minimum wages, but higher enrollment rate of sec-
ondary school students is associated with lower minimum wages. Third, a
higher number of large-scale enterprises is associated with higher minimum
wages, which could be explained by higher demand for labor. In addition, the
estimates from the dynamic estimation equation (3.2) have positive coefficients
on the lagged minimum wage term, suggesting that minimum wage standards
might be persistent over time.
3.6.2 Race on enforcement
Table 3.3 presents estimation results for jurisdictional interdependence on min-
imum wage enforcement using different estimation methods and the inverse
distance weighting matrix. Enforcement is proxied by the headcount ratio of
minimum wage violation. Model 1 uses MLE method; Model 2 shows IV/GMM
estimation results; Model 3 uses the Arellano-Bond difference GMM estimation
method.
The results consistently show evidence of a race on enforcement, with the
point estimate ranging in [0.38, 0.85] across three models. In other words, if
the weighted violation rate in other cities increases by 1 percentage point, the
violation rate in the host city will increase by 0.38-0.85 percentage points. The
insignificant coefficient on the lagged violation rate in the dynamic model (in
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Table 3.2: Results of the analysis of min wage standards, 2004-12
MLE IV Arellano-Bond
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Contiguous Distance Contiguous Distance Contiguous Distance
Spatial lag of minimum wages 0.72*** 0.97*** 0.99*** 2.33*** 0.98*** 3.23***
(0.02) (0.00) (0.11) (0.18) (0.04) (0.17)
L. min wage 0.06** 0.05
(0.03) (0.03)
GDP (log) 5.03 -8.65 12.73* -0.80 20.29 -33.80
(8.45) (10.90) (7.31) (8.02) (26.01) (26.46)
per capita GDP (log) -8.90 -4.42 -12.99** -9.42 -37.47** -33.05*
(6.36) (8.46) (5.55) (6.36) (16.55) (19.49)
Labor participation Rate (%) 0.79** 1.16*** 0.77*** 1.48*** 2.64** 5.22***
(0.34) (0.40) (0.30) (0.37) (1.07) (1.23)
Industry share (%) -0.39 -0.61* -0.21 -0.23 -0.09 0.51
(0.27) (0.35) (0.20) (0.22) (0.41) (0.53)
# of enterprises (1000) 5.55* 8.98** 3.27 8.56** -1.84 1.61
(2.99) (3.85) (3.93) (3.45) (2.95) (3.54)
# of beds in hospitals -13.49 -25.68** -5.46 -10.15 -8.85 34.34
(10.28) (11.71) (8.75) (9.26) (26.11) (25.18)
stud enroll in secondary school -1.73*** -1.73*** -1.74*** -1.67*** -0.72 -0.29
(0.50) (0.54) (0.51) (0.47) (1.10) (1.38)
% of secondary employment (%) -0.33 -0.53* -0.14 -0.20 -0.94** -1.17*
(0.22) (0.28) (0.18) (0.21) (0.46) (0.60)
stud enroll in primary school 0.95 2.51** 0.02 1.48* -0.59 -2.67
(0.95) (1.14) (0.73) (0.79) (1.58) (1.93)
City FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 2016 2016 2016 2016 1512 1512
R2 0.96 0.94
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F stat 66.21 305.17
Hansen J statistic (p-val) 0.750 0.245 0.822 0.773
AR (2) p-value 0.998 0.210
Model 1-2 show MLE estimation results. Column 1 uses simple contiguity matrix (equation W1); column 2 uses inverse
distance matrix (Equation W2). Likewise, Model 3-4 show IV/GMM estimation results; Model 5-6 use Arellano-Bond
difference GMM estimation method, using all lagged terms as instruments in addition to weighted averages of other
cities’ economic characteristics. Results also hold using Arellano-Bond system GMM method. Control variables are
taken 1-year lags. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at city level. Year 2009 is dropped from all anal-
ysis, because no minimum wage adjustments occurred in any cities during the year. * p < 0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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column 3) suggests that the enforcement is not persistent over time. The share
of secondary industry among total GDP and the share of employment in sec-
ondary industry are both positively associated with the violation rates of the
minimum wage laws. In addition, the positive estimates of Kaitz ratio (min-
imum wage divided by median wages) indicate that a higher minimum-to-
median wage ratio results in a higher violation rate of minimum wage laws
in the city.
3.7 Robustness checks
3.7.1 Robustness to sample changes
There might be potential concerns that the evidence of spatial interdependence
in minimum wage standards is driven by sample selection issues. To address
this concern, we conduct the following two robustness checks. In Figure 3.1
we plot the estimated spatial interdependence after drop a provincial-level unit
from the whole sample. For instance, the first point shows that the magni-
tude of spatial interdependence is 2.35 after excluding Beijing; the second point
shows that the magnitude of spatial interdependence is about 2.4 after exclud-
ing Tianjin; and so on. These estimates are derived using the IV/GMM method,
while using the MLE and Arellano-Bond estimation methods give similar re-
sults. Overall, the IV/GMM point estimates are not sensitive to dropping a
particular province, with the magnitudes in the range [2.1, 2.5].
In the second robustness analysis, we include only top 10 (or 20, . . . , 90)
percent nearest cities in the construction of inverse distance weighting matrices,
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Table 3.3: Results of the analysis of minimum wage enforcement, 2004-09
MLE IV/GMM Arellano-Bond GMM
(1) (2) (3)
Spatial lag (Violation Rate) 0.38** 0.60* 0.85*
(0.16) (0.36) (0.48)
L. Violation Rate -0.07
(0.11)
GDP (log) 1.78 1.99 7.60
(1.93) (1.67) (14.61)
per capita GDP (log) -0.35 -0.31 -3.93
(1.35) (1.45) (6.69)
Labor participation Rate (%) -0.12* -0.13* -0.03
(0.06) (0.07) (0.44)
Industry share (%) 0.15*** 0.14*** 0.09
(0.06) (0.05) (0.16)
# of enterprises (1000) 0.02 0.07 0.37
(0.39) (0.45) (1.57)
# of beds in hospitals 0.29 -0.08 -3.00
(2.92) (2.99) (7.95)
student enroll in secondary school -0.32 -0.34 -0.08
(0.30) (0.28) (2.29)
% of secondary employment 0.10* 0.11** 0.11
(0.05) (0.05) (0.18)
student enrollment in primary school -0.34 -0.34 0.13
(0.24) (0.21) (0.82)
Kaitz ratio (%) 0.42*** 0.40*** 0.36***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.14)
City FE Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y
Observations 396 396 264
R2 0.48
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F stat 63.56
Hansen J P-value 0.860 0.662
AR (2) p-value 0.360
Model 1 shows MLE estimation results. Model 2 shows IV/GMM estimation results;
Model 3 uses Arellano-Bond difference GMM estimation method. All models use inverse
distance weighting matrices to construct the spatial lag term. Control variables are taken
1-year lags. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at city level. * p < 0.10, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Figure 3.1: Robustness of minimum wage competition to dropping a
province
Each point estimate is the coefficient of the spatial lag of minimum wages,
using IV/GMM estimation method and inverse distance weighting matrix,
after dropping the labelled province.
then re-estimate the model using the IV/GMM method and plot the coefficients
of the spatial lag term in Figure 3.2. This subsample analysis addresses the
concern that the host city might put zero weight on some faraway cities, and
hence using all cities to construct the weighting matrix might be too general. To
implement this idea, we first rank the distance of all other cities to the host city.
Assume that the host city only references minimum wages standards in cities
that are within, for example, the top 10 percent in distance, or 25 (=10% * 252)
closest cities. Then we re-estimate the model using the IV/GMM method. The
estimated spatial interdependence is about 1.1, as plotted in Figure 3.2. Overall,
as more cities are included in the weighting matrix, the spatial interdependence
gets stronger.
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Figure 3.2: Robustness of minimum wage competition to the exclusion of
distant cities
Note: Each point estimate is the coefficient of the spatial lag of minimum
wages, using IV/GMM estimation method and inverse distance weighting
matrix, including the top x percent nearest cities.
Likewise, there might be potential concerns that the evidence of spatial in-
terdependence in minimum wage enforcement is also driven by sample selec-
tion. We conduct similar subsample analysis and plot the figures parallel to
Figure 3.1 and 3.2. Figure 3.3 suggests that the evidence of spatial interdepen-
dence in minimum wage enforcement is robust to dropping any provinces, with
the estimated magnitude ranging between 0.2 and 1.1. Figure 3.4 suggests that
the evidence is also robust to the exclusion of faraway cities from the distance
weighting matrix.
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Figure 3.3: Robustness of minimum wage enforcement competition to
dropping a province
Note: Each point estimate is the coefficient of the spatial lag of minimum wage
violation rates, using IV/GMM estimation method and inverse distance
weighting matrix, after dropping the labelled province.
3.7.2 Robustness of results to alternative weighting matrices
In the main results, we use distance-based weighting matrices to derive the es-
timates. However, economic distance might also be important. A city might
be more likely to reference minimum wage standards in cities that have similar
economic development levels rather than cities do not. Using economic charac-
teristics as weights is common in the literature (e.g. Davies and Vadlamannati,
2013; Olney, 2013). Therefore, we construct four economic characteristics-based
weighting matrices.
Economic characteristics are all taken from the year 2003, one year prior
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Figure 3.4: Robustness of minimum wage enforcement competition to the
exclusion of distant cities
Note: Each point estimate is the coefficient of the spatial lag of minimum wage
violation rates, using IV/GMM estimation method and inverse distance
weighting matrix, including the top x% nearest cities.
to the first year of our analysis, so that the weighting matrix is arguably ex-
ogenous. In the case of GDP weighting matrix, the weight is given by ωj,i =
1
|lnGDPj,t=2003−lnGDPi,t=2003| , then standardized to row sum equal to 1. Likewise,
we replace log GDP by three other economic indicators, labor force partici-
pation rate, the number of enterprises and per capita GDP, to construct three
other weighting matrices. Lastly, we dot multiply the inverse distance weight-
ing matrix and the per capita GDP weighting matrix to construct a new matrix,
which will then incorporate both geographical and economic distance. Table 3.4
presents estimation results using these weighting matrices and different estima-
tion methods. Again, the results are robust to the choice of weighting matrices.
All models give consistent results of spatial dependence in minimum wage stan-
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dards. The magnitudes of estimation are also comparable to those in the main
results.
Similarly, we construct economic characteristics-based weighting matrices
and re-estimate the race on the enforcement models. Results in Table 3.5
show that MLE and Arellano-Bond estimations yield significant results, while
IV/GMM estimation does not.
3.8 Conclusion
The theory of fiscal and regulatory competition between jurisdictions is more
advanced than its empirical testing. This is particularly true of labor regula-
tion in general, and minimum wage regulation in particular, and especially so
for developing countries. Olney (2013) finds evidence of a race to the bottom in
employment protection among OECD countries, with reaction coefficient of 1.0-
2.8. Davies and Vadlamannati (2013) find labor rights in one country are posi-
tively correlated with those elsewhere, i.e. a cut in labor rights in other countries
reduces labor rights in the host country, with the reaction coefficient about 0.55-
0.88. They also argue that international competition lies more in enforcement
than in labor laws.
This paper focuses on within-country competition on labor standards, and
takes up the case of China, which introduced a vigorous minimum wage
regime from the mid-2000s onwards. The analysis utilizes the spatial lag frame-
work and three estimation methods (including maximum likelihood estima-
tion, IV/GMM method and Arellano-Bond GMM method) to study city-level
strategic interactions in setting and enforcing minimum wage standards during
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Table 3.4: Robustness of minimum wage competition to alternative
weighting matrices
2003 GDP
(log)
Labor force
part. rate
# of enterprise
Distance &
(log) per cap GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: MLE Results
Spatial lag 0.16*** 0.18*** 0.38*** 0.92***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.08) (0.02)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
City FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2016 2016 2016 2016
Panel B: IV/GMM Results
Spatial lag 1.42*** 0.73*** 1.12*** 1.07***
(0.30) (0.27) (0.28) (0.07)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
City FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2016 2016 2016 2016
R2 0.88 0.90 0.90 0.96
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistics 52.84 49.98 225.00 179.60
Hansen J statistic 0.52 0.40 0.49 0.23
Panel C: Arellano-Bond GMM Results
Spatial lag 0.63*** 0.32** 0.98*** 1.19***
(0.15) (0.15) (0.19) (0.04)
L. min wage 0.10** 0.14*** 0.08* 0.09***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
City FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1512 1512 1512 1512
Hansen J P-value 0.737 0.747 0.736 0.781
AR (2) p-value 0.395 0.250 0.414 0.371
Each column uses a different weighting matrix to construct the spatial lag. Column (1) uses 2003 GDP (log);
column (2) labor force participation rate; column (3) the number of enterprises; column (4) combines inverse
distance and per capita GDP. Panel A show MLE estimation results for each model; Panel B IV/GMM esti-
mation results; Panel C uses Arellano-Bond difference GMM estimation methods, using all lagged terms as
instruments in addition to weighted averages of other cities’ economic characteristics. Control variables are
taken 1-year lags. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at city level. * p < 0.10, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01.
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Table 3.5: Robustness of enforcement competition to alternative weighting
matrices
2003 GDP
(log)
Labor force
part. rate
# of enterprise
Distance &
(log) per cap GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: MLE Results
Spatial lag (violation rate) 0.06 0.20*** 0.21* 0.13*
(0.09) (0.06) (0.11) (0.07)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
City FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 396 396 396 396
Panel B: IV/GMM Results
Spatial lag (violation rate) 0.18 0.15 0.09 0.26
(0.61) (0.40) (0.48) (0.54)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
City FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 396 396 396 396
R2 0.46 0.48 0.47 0.47
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistics 8.33 9.18 9.64 5.34
Hansen J statistic 0.59 0.69 0.73 0.10
Panel C: Arellano-Bond GMM Results
Spatial lag (violation rate) 0.68* 0.72** 0.70** 0.26
(0.35) (0.32) (0.33) (0.36)
L. min wage (violation rate) -0.05 -0.16 -0.07 -0.06
(0.12) (0.13) (0.08) (0.12)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
City FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 264 264 264 264
Hansen J P-value 0.701 0.744 0.535 0.887
AR (2) p-value 0.419 0.461 0.138 0.114
Each column uses a different weighting matrix to construct the spatial lag. Column (1) uses 2003 GDP (log);
column (2) labor force participation rate; column (3) the number of enterprises; column (4) combines inverse
distance and per capita GDP. Panel A show MLE estimation results for each model; Panel B IV/GMM estima-
tion results; Panel C uses Arellano-Bond difference GMM estimation methods, using lagged terms as instru-
ments in addition to weighted averages of other cities’ economic characteristics. Control variables are taken
1-year lags. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at city level. * p < 0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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2004-2012 in China. We manually collect a panel data set of city-level minimum
wage standards from China’s government websites. The analysis finds strong
evidence of spatial correlation in minimum wage standards and enforcement
among main cities in China. If other cities decrease minimum wage standards
by 1 RMB, the host city will decrease its standard by about 0.7-3.2 RMB. If the
violation rate in other cities increases by 1 percentage point, the host city will
respond by an increase of roughly 0.4-1.0 percentage points.
The Chinese government has expanded minimum wage intervention
greatly, in response to concerns about rising inequality. Our results show that
there is significant interjurisdictional competition on the level of the minimum
wage and in enforcement among local governments. Such competition could
be wasteful, and lead to a race to the bottom, undermining the government’s
objectives. The interactions identified in this paper thus suggest the need for
policy coordination on labor regulation in China.
Our analysis has broader significance given the resurgence of interest in
minimum wages in developing countries as an instrument for addressing ris-
ing inequality. Thus Bhorat et al. (2017) provide a review of minimum wages
in Africa. They find that “most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) have
adopted minimum wage regulation” and that “SSA as whole reflects a bias to-
wards a more aggressive minimum wage policy compared to the rest of the
world.” In South Africa, for example, the current government has proposed a
national minimum wage to replace the collection of sector and region specific
minimum wages. The question of whether to allow local setting of minimum
wages to take account of local conditions is an area of open debate. In Asia, the
decentralization reforms in Indonesia were accompanied by a decree allowing
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local governments to set minimum wages. As countries like Myanmar start a
new era of labor regulation, the questions of minimum wages and local flex-
ibility in implementation are at the forefront. In Russia, minimum wage set-
ting was decentralized in 2007. Around the world, therefore, interjurisdictional
competition in minimum wages is a live issue. Our analysis provides an initial
framework in which competing perspectives on these debates can be assessed
quantitatively.
Our evidence on jurisdictional interdependence in minimum wage setting
within a country also raises a set of interesting further research questions. What
we have shown is that local government react to each other in setting minimum
wages, and in enforcement of minimum wages. A natural interpretation of that
is a possible “race to the bottom”, as jurisdictions lower labor standards to at-
tract investment. But could there also be a “race to the top” in other dimensions?
Rather than lower labor standards, a local government could improve infras-
tructure, or improve the quality of local governance, to make investment more
attractive. This could set in motion a chain of reactions through which other
localities respond by improving their infrastructure and business environment
so that there is an upward virtuous cycle of overall improvement in labor pro-
ductivity rather than a downward vicious spiral of lowering labor costs through
lowering labor standards. This raises the empirical question—do we see such
a virtuous race to the top in practice? And the policy question—what can the
government do to trigger the virtuous spiral?
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Figure A.1: Distribution of district-wise NREGA labor expenditure during
2006-2010
Note: Per capita labor expenditure is calculated as total labor expenditure of NREGA projects
(Rupees) divided by rural population in the district. NREGA work data comes from MGN-
REGA Public data portal. Only districts in the final regression sample are included.
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Figure A.2: Probability Distribution of Gini Coefficient, 2005
Source: The author calculated Gini coefficient of landownersihp based on district-wise land
distribution data from 2005 India Agricultural census.
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Figure A.3: Map of India
Source: Banerjee & Iyer (2005).
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Figure A.4: Rainfall deviation during wet season, 1973-2002
Source: Original data is downloaded from India Water Portal. District-year wise rainfall de-
viation is the difference between rainfall during the main growing season (wet season = June-
November) and the long-term average in the district, normalized by the standard deviation.
117
Table A.1: Comparison of Landlord and Non-Landlord district character-
istics
Mean Difference Standard Error
Gini coef. -0.039*** (0.010)
Rural area (Sq. km) 624.982 (665.989)
wet season rainfall (100 mm) 0.041 (0.046)
% of land covered in fine soil -7.299*** (2.340)
% of land covered in medium soil 12.757** (5.138)
% of Rural pop 7.522*** (1.853)
Literacy rate -5.585*** (1.900)
% of SC population 1.506 (1.536)
% of ST population -0.821 (1.638)
Work-population ratio 0.507 (0.852)
% of Main workers 0.676 (0.756)
% of Marginal workers 0.048 (0.845)
% of non Workers -0.507 (0.852)
% of Agricultural labourers -0.984 (1.660)
% of Cultivators 8.279*** (1.984)
% of Household industry workers -1.116 (0.787)
% of Other industries -6.303*** (1.805)
% villages with Safe Drinking water -0.009 (0.462)
% villages with Electricity (Power Supply) -6.726* (3.503)
% villages with Paved approach road -5.404** (2.628)
% villages with Primary school -0.960 (2.748)
% villages with Medical facility -4.433 (3.386)
% villages with Post and telephone facility -2.977 (3.297)
Ag Wages (Rs/day 1996) -0.131*** (0.033)
Rs. per Hectare. 1990-1993 -0.562 (0.420)
Composite Backwardness Index -0.100** (0.049)
Observations 457
This table shows the difference of geographic and economic characteristics between land-
lord and non-landlord districts. Each row estimate is derived by regressing the row vari-
able on gini coefficient and state dummies. The sample is restricted at the IV sample in
Table 1.7.
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Table A.2: Comparison of Land distribution in 2005 and 2010
Variables 2005 (mean) 2010 (mean) Mean Diff
top10 0.359 0.357 -0.002
top20 0.528 0.525 -0.003
top30 0.648 0.645 -0.003
top40 0.739 0.735 -0.004
bot40 0.136 0.140 0.004
bot30 0.092 0.095 0.003
bot20 0.056 0.059 0.002
bot10 0.026 0.028 0.001
mid40 80 0.380 0.380 0
mid50 80 0.336 0.336 0
Gini 0.466 0.460 -0.006
Number of districts 528 561
Notes: Top10 means the share of land by top 10% land holdings.
mid40-80 denotes the share of land by middle 40-80 percent of land
holdings.
119
Table A.3: Dep var: Share of households provided with NREGA jobs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Gini coef. -0.23*** -0.76** -0.71*** -0.70*** -0.77***
(0.07) (0.30) (0.20) (0.23) (0.24)
log rural area(Sq. km) 0.24 0.38* 0.60*** 0.42*
(0.17) (0.22) (0.23) (0.23)
log Rural population -0.39** -0.55*** -0.35* -0.60***
(0.15) (0.20) (0.20) (0.21)
Literacy rate -0.92 -0.88 0.70 -0.84
(0.63) (0.80) (0.89) (0.84)
Wet season rainfall deviation -0.07* -0.11*** -0.12*** -0.11***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
% of land covered in fine soil -1.67*** -3.28*** -3.27*** -3.64***
(0.54) (0.80) (0.92) (0.94)
% of land covered in medium soil -0.67* -1.60*** -1.51** -1.85***
(0.39) (0.53) (0.62) (0.59)
% of Agricultural labourers 1.91*** 2.44*** 3.57*** 2.72***
(0.56) (0.73) (0.99) (0.81)
% of Main workers 3.90** 5.40*** 8.03*** 5.30***
(1.59) (1.93) (2.21) (2.00)
% of Marginal workers -1.79 -1.37 3.45 -1.20
(1.50) (1.80) (2.14) (1.89)
% of SCST population 1.05** 0.56 1.91*** 0.76
(0.47) (0.61) (0.71) (0.62)
% villages with Safe Drinking water -1.02 -2.07 -1.63 -1.88
(3.18) (3.29) (3.93) (3.44)
% villages with Electricity (Power Supply) 1.06** 1.03* 0.36 0.92
(0.42) (0.57) (0.65) (0.59)
% villages with Paved approach road 0.37 1.29** 0.54 1.36**
(0.44) (0.61) (0.64) (0.64)
% villages with Primary school 1.31*** 1.60*** 2.17*** 1.58***
(0.46) (0.49) (0.53) (0.50)
% villages with Medical facility 0.45 0.55* 0.60 0.53
(0.31) (0.33) (0.44) (0.34)
% villages with Post and telephone facility -1.93*** -1.96*** -2.33*** -1.94***
(0.38) (0.40) (0.49) (0.41)
Phase 2 indicator -0.77*** -0.79*** -0.80***
(0.10) (0.13) (0.13)
Phase 3 indicator -0.99*** -0.97*** -1.03***
(0.11) (0.13) (0.14)
Composite Backwardness Index -0.00 0.13 0.37*
(0.11) (0.23) (0.19)
Observations 570 570 570 570 570
First-stage F statistics 15.08 17.77 14.83 14.73
Notes: Column 1 shows OLS results; Column 2-5 present IV estimates with different sets of covari-
ates added. Dependent variable is the share of households provided with NREGA jobs in each year
during 2006-2010. District-wise land Gini coefficient is constructed using 2005 Indian Agricultural
census. They are standardized by respective standard deviation of the sample. Instrumental variable
is a binary indicator that equals 1 if the district in question was a landlord district (i.e. landlords were
responsible for collecting land revenue collection) in British Raj. All models include year and state
dummy. * p < 0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table B.1: Descriptive Statistics, 2004-2012
Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max
GDP (log) 2,268 5.7 1.2 2.5 9.9
per capita GDP (log) 2,268 10.3 0.7 8.0 12.6
Labor participation Rate (%) 2,268 17.6 10.4 1.8 97.4
Industry share (%) 2,268 51.5 12.0 8.0 89.0
# of enterprises (1000) 2,268 0.6 1.4 0.0 18.5
# of beds in hospitals (per 100 people) 2,268 0.5 0.2 0.0 2.5
stud enroll in secondary sch (per 100 people) 2,268 6.6 2.6 0.9 71.6
% of secondary employment 2,268 47.6 14.0 3.8 81.9
stud enroll in primary sch (per 100 people) 2,268 7.8 3.0 1.1 32.5
Minimum wages (deflated by 2002 CPI) 2,268 530.3 155.9 212.0 1164.2
Kaitz ratio (%) 396 38.0 9.1 18.6 72.0
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